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Summary findings
Dehn estimates the effects on growth of commodity price  It defines the dependent variable to allow an
shocks and uncertainty within an established empirical  assessment of the longer-term implications of temporary
growth model. Ex post shocks and ex ante uncertainty  trade shocks.
have been treated in the empirical literature as if they  *  It imposes no priors on h1ow  commodity price
were synonymous. But they are distinct concepts and it is  movements affect growth, but compares and contrasts a
both theoretically and empirically inappropriate  to treat  range of competing shock and uncertainty specifications.
them as synonymous.  Dehn resolves the disagreement about the long-run
He slhows  that the interaction between policy and aid  effect of positive shocks on growth, finding that positive
is robust to the inclusion of variables capturing  shocks have no long-run impact on growth  (that
commodity price movements. More important,  his  windfalls from trade shocks do not translate into
approach departs in three ways from earlier empirical  sustainable increases in income).
studies of the subject:  He shows that negative shocks have large, highly
* It deals with issues of endogeneity without incurring  significant, and negative effects on growth, but that
an excessive loss of efficiency.  commodity price uncertainty does not affect growth.
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It has long been believed  that commodity  price variability  causes problems for
primary-producing developing countries, both  for  the  governments and for  the
producers themselves. For governnents, unforeseen variations in export prices can
complicate  budgetary  planning and can  jeopardize  the attainment  of debt targets. This
is a particularly serious problem .or HIPCs, all of which are highly dependent on
commodity  exports. For exporters,  price variability  increases  cash flow variability and
reduces the collateral value of invrntories: Both factors work to increase borrowing
costs. Finally, smallholder farmers, often with poor  access to  efficient savings
instruments, cope with  revenue variability through crop  diversification with  the
consequence that  they largely fDrego the potential benefits obtainable through
specialization.  For all of these reasons, we should expect vulnerability  to commodity
price variability to retard growth.
There is less agreement  about which particular manifestations  of commodity
price movements  matter to developing  countries.  The literature  is replete of references
to volatility, variability, and uncertainty.  Other studies have paid attention to trends
and to discrete price shocks. The paper focus specifically  on two manifestations of
commodity price movements, namely discrete temporary ex post commodity price
shocks and commodity  price uncertainty.  The latter can be thought of as the ex ante
manifestation of commodity  price unpredictability.  The emphasis  on these particular
mnanifestations  of commodity  price movements is not accidental;  the importance of
large discrete price changes  has been recognized  in the 'Dutch Disease' literature for
some time, while an older, larger amd  more diverse  literature has examined  the effects
of commodity  price uncertainty  in various  contexts.
This paper departs from earlier  contributions  in two regards. Firstly, the paper
aims to be more specific about which attributes of commodity price movements
matter to growth in developing countries,  to measure  their impact, and to document
their robustness.  Discrete  shocks cand  uncertainty  about future prices  have been treated
in the empirical  commodity  price literature more or less as if they were synonymous.
Studies of shocks have invariably  ignored  uncertainty  about future prices a potential
regressor,  and similarly  studies  of commodity  price uncertainty  have not tested for the
3effects  of  current  period  shocks.  However,  shocks  and  uncertainty  are  distinct
concepts  and it is therefore both  theoretically  and  empirically  inappropriate  to  treat
them  as synonymous.  The paper therefore departs from Collier and Gunning (1999a),
whose  analysis  is restricted  to positive  shock episodes,  by examining  the  effects of
both positive and negative shocks. Similarly, this paper tests for asymmetric effects of
large  price  changes  on  growth and  thus  departs  from the  analyses  of Deaton  and
Miller  (1995) and  Deaton  (1999) who  impose an assumption  of symmetry  between
small  and  large  price  changes.  Finally,  by  modeling  ex post  shocks  and  ex  ante
uncertainty  jointly,  it  is  possible  to  determine  which  of  these  manifestations  of
commodity price  movements  are most relevant to growth, and, in the event  both are
important, to avoid omitted variable bias.
Secondly, the paper aims to obtain better estimates of the long term effects of
exposure  to  shocks  and  uncertainty.  Recently,  the  availability  of  reasonably  long
panel  data sets covering  a substantial group of developing  countries has facilitated  a
more systematic evaluation of the determinants of relative growth rates in developing
countries - see  Temple (1999) for a survey. It is therefore  a natural  step forward  to
examine  the importance  of commodity  shocks  and  uncertainty  in the  context  of an
established  empirical panel  growth model.  By using  epoch growth rates  rather  than
annual  growth  rates  and  cyclical  income  changes,  it  is  possible  to  obtain  better
estimates  of long term effects of exposure to shocks  and uncertainty.  This increases
the scope for resolving the debate between Deaton and Miller (1995) and Collier and
Gunning  (1999a)  over  the medium  to long  run  implications  of positive  shocks  for
economic growth.
The analysis  shows that per  capita growth rates  are significantly  reduced  by
large  discrete  negative  commodity  price  shocks,  while  positive  commodity  price
shocks  and  commodity  price  uncertainty  do  not  exert  an  influence  on  economic
growth.  The magnitude of the effect of negative shocks on growth is very substantial,
and appears to work independently of investment,  which suggests that the adjustment
is  achieved  through  severe reductions  in capacity  utilization.  Negative  shocks  also
remain  highly  significant  after  controlling  for  government  economic  policy  and
institutional  quality, which indicates that the result cannot be attributed exclusively to
inappropriate  policy  responses  on the part of governments.  The results  are robust to
4changes in sample composition, changing the time series dimensions of the data,
instrumenting  for endogenous  regressors,  and across  different  estimation  methods.
The paper is structured a; follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes  the panel
growth literature and Section 3 discusses  the relationships  between uncertainty and
growth, and shocks and growth, respectively.  The empirical literature on shocks and
uncertainty are also reviewed. Section 4 describes the structure of a new data set
compiled to evaluate commodity price effects, and Sections 5 and 6 describe the
distribution of  discrete shocks and uncertainty in  a  sample of  113 developing
countries, respectively. In  Section 7,  the analytical framework for an  empirical
examination of  the effects of u-certainty and shocks on growth is  presented. A
canonical growth model framework  is augmented  to include measure of commodity
price uncertainty  and shocks.  Secl  ion 8 looks at methodological  issues involved  in the
estimation  of panel growth models.  In Section  9, the results of the regression analysis
and robustness  tests are presented,  and Section 10 concludes.
2.  Panel growth models
In his recent review of thie growth evidence, Temple (1999) underlines the
current lack of consensus  with regard  to the specification  of empirical  growth models.
Two broad canonical models have featured in the empirical growth literature. The
models by Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996), Islam (1995), Mankiw, Romer and
Weil (1992), and Hoeffler  (1999), all of which are closely  based on theoretical  growth
models, define the first class. The other type of model, typified by Barro (1991) and
subsequently widely replicated, places far  more emphasis on the role of policy
variables.
These two approaches Exe  not mutually exclusive. Consider the Mankiw,
Romer and Weil (1992) augmented Solow model with convergence. The central
empirical  specification  is
gy, = a. +  a, log(s,) +,Blog(n  + t,7  - 6) -y log(y 0 )  [1]
5where  s,  denotes  the  total  savings  rate,  which  consists  of  aid,  domestic  savings,
foreign savings, and other foreign flows. g,,  is the rate of growth of per capita GDP,
and  y0 is the initial  income per  effective  worker at  some initial  date. The latter  is
intended to capture the extent of deviations from the steady state, while  n,tp, c  denote
the  rates  of  population  growth,  technical  progress  and  depreciation  respectively,
which are typically assumed to grow at exogenously determined constant rates and are
thus subsumable into the intercept.
In equations such as [1], it is popular to substitute out savings in terms of its
determinants,  an  approach  first  proposed  by  Papanek  (1972),  and  since  widely
adopted  following  the  influential  paper  by  Barro  (1991). Using  standard  national
income identities,  savings  may be expressed  in terms  of domestic  investment  (id,),
and foreign investment (if  ) as follows:
s, - id, +  if, -=  i,  [2]
where  ti,  is the total investment rate. Equation [1] can then be rewritten as
g,,  = a,  + a, log(ti,) - y log(y0)  [3]
which makes explicit the link from investment to growth. Subsequent  studies may be
grouped into three broad classes:
a)  Studies that replace  savings by government  and private  investment rates without
including  policy  variables  of any  kind  (see  for  example  Caselli,  Esquivel  and
Lefort  (1996),  Islam  (1995),  Mankiw,  Romer  and  Weil  (1992),  and  Hoeffler
(1999)).  In these models,  empirical  specifications  closely follow  the underlying
theory.
b)  Studies  that  focus  on  policy  variables  and  exclude  investment  variables.
Prominent papers in this tradition include Bumside and Dollar (1997), Hansen and
Tarp  (1999a),  and  Guillaumont  and  Chauvet  (1999).  The  argument  justifying
substitution  of  policy  variables  for  investment  is  that  policy  and  external
environment  variables  fully explain  how  investment  influences growth.  In other
words, these variables may be thought of as incentive variables.
6c)  Studies that contain a mixture af investment and incentive variables (Hadjimichael
et al. (1995), Barro (1991), and Lensink and Morrissey (1999)).  The simultaneous
inclusion of both investment arid incentive variables raises issues of interpretation.
For example, when investment is included, the other variables in the model affect
growth through the 'level  of efficiency',  whereas when investment is omitted the
effect of other variables on growth is either via investment, via efficiency, or both.
The implication  is that in certain circumstances  it may be insightful to  estimate
growth  equations both with and  without investment  included as in Lensink  and
Morrissey (1999).
Since our purpose is to investigate the impact of commodity price uncertainty
and  shocks  on  developing  count-y performance,  we  adopt an  established  empirical
model,  which  allows  approxim  ate  comparisons  of  our  results  with  those  from
previous  studies. In particular,  w.  use the data set compiled by Burnside and Dollar
(1997), and  in the main  we  closely follow their intermediate  approach - (b) in  the
above classification.
A  word  on  the  measurernent  of economic  growth:  Over  a  given  period,  a
change in income partly reflects cyclical transitory income changes and partly reflects
underlying permanent changes in income.  From a theoretical point of view, economic
growth  refers  to  the  latter  only.  In empirical  analysis, however,  growth rates  are
usually  calculated  without  drawing  a  distinction  between transitory  and  permanent
income  changes.  Since  growth  rates  calculated  thus  only  make  use  of  end  point
observations,  they  are  potentially  very  sensitive  to  outliers  caused  by  transitory
cyclical  movements  in  income.  To  minimize  this  bias,  growth  rates  are  usually
calculated over longer periods, typically 5 to 10 years for panel estimation, and up to
20 or 30 years in cross-section studies. This paper follows other contributions to the
empirical  growth  literature  by  not  drawing  a  distinction  between  transitory  and
permanent  changes  income. The reasons  are twofold:  First,  the  number  of  annual
observations  on  GDP  in  most  developing  countries  is  insufficient  to  enable  an
unambiguous decomposition of income into its permanent and transitory components.
Secondly,  to  the  extent  that  the  adjustment  to  temporary  shocks  and  uncertainty
involves transitory  changes in capacity utilization,  it is useful  to be able to capture
such effects.  We are  obviously  presented with  an identification  problem  since we
cannot determine  whether the o !served income changes are transitory or permanent,
7but if the transitory adjustment processes to shocks  and uncertainty  are lengthy the
distinction  may  be  largely  irrelevant,  particularly  if  policy  makers  have  relatively
short time horizons.
3. Commodity  price  uncertainty,  shocks, and growth
The  uncertainty  variables  which  have  received  particular  attention  in  the
empirical growth literature include measures of political instability,  business cycles,
and  inflation.  A number  of studies have  found negative  correlations  between these
variables  and growth 2. One way to think about how uncertainty affects growth is via
factor accumulation, technical progress, and efficiency. Technical progress and factor
accumulation shift out the production possibility  frontier, while efficiency brings the
economy from a point within the frontier to a point closer to the perimeter.
The theoretical  literature shows that the link between  uncertainty and  factor
accumulation  - investment  - depends  on  the  relationship  between  the  expected
marginal  revenue  product  of  capital and  the  uncertainty  variable.  When the  profit
function  is convex, the link between investment  and uncertainty  is positive 3. When
investments are irreversible the positive  link is not broken, but a range of inaction is
created  within  which  investment  does not respond  to  the conventional  net  present
value criterion - see Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Abel and Eberly (1994). A negative
relationship between investment and uncertainty requires either imperfect competition
or decreasing  returns to scale or both (see Caballero (1991)). Additionally, aggregate
uncertainty  may  have  effects,  which  are  distinct  from  those  of  idiosyncratic
uncertainty.  Caballero  and  Pindyck  (1996)  show  that  aggregate  uncertainty  has
asymmetric effects, because in good states there is free entry, while in bad states free
exit is not possible if investments are irreversible. Hence, positive shocks do not raise
profits,  while  negative  shocks  lower  them,  so  the  average  payoff  is decreased  by
uncertainty.
The  empirical  literature  shows  a  robust  negative  association  between
investment  and  certain  sources  of  uncertainty.  Serven  (1998)  estimates  private
2  Bleaney and Greenaway (1993) and Aizenman and Marion (1993) find that policy instability lowers growth. Similarly,
inflation has been shown to be negatively related to growth, although  the correlation is not robust (Levine and Renelt (1990),
Levine and Zervos (1993)).  Gyimah-Brempong  and Traynor (1999) find a significant  negative correlation between growth and
political instability.
I  Hartman  (1972) abstracted  from agent attitudes to risk.Zeira  (1987) shows that when investors  are risk averse the investment-
uncertainty link becomes  ambiguous  even under the conditions  specified  by Hartman.
8investment equations for a large number of developing countries and finds very robust
evidence  in  favor  of  a  negative  link  between  real  exchange  rate  uncertainty  and
investment 4. Given the robust  link between investment and  growth (see  Levine and
Renelt (1990)), it seems reasonabl- to suppose that real exchange rate uncertainty will
also  have  a  strong  negative  effect  on  growth 5. However, after  controlling  for real
exchange rate uncertainty Serven finds that terms of trade uncertainty per  se is not a
significant determinant  of investment. This  suggests that  to the extent that terms of
trade  uncertainty  affects growth it must do so via routes  other than  investment,  for
example via efficiency and/or the rate of adoption of new technologies.
The link between uncertainty and technical  progress is less well  understood
and  only  rarely  modeled  empiric-ally. Ramey and  Ramey  (1995) cite  a  model  by
Fischer Black which predicts a positive link between  growth and uncertainty  on the
grounds that agents can choose from a shelf with high risk/high return technologies
and low risk/low return technologies. Uncertainty in this model facilitates growth by
allowing agents to exploit differenit  technologies as external conditions change.
The empirical evidence in favor of a growth-commodity price uncertainty link
is relatively weak.  The classic study is MacBean (1966), who  failed to  support the
hypothesis that export instability reduces growth in developing countries. Subsequent
contributions include Erb and Sclhiavo-Campo  (1969), Glezakos (1973), Knudsen and
Parnes  (1975),  Yotopoulos  and  Nugent  (1976),  Lutz  (1994),  Guillaumont,
Guillaumont Jeanneney and Brun  (1999), and Guillaumont and Chauvet (1999). The
latter study finds that a broad measure of instability (which includes the variability of
terms of trade) remains  significant with a negative coefficient in a growth regression
which  includes  investment as a regressor. This supports the notion that uncertainty
operates via efficiency or technical progress, but is it not possible on the basis of this
study to determine if the result iE  due to commodity price uncertainty or to some other
component  in the composite vulnerability index. There is some indication, however,
4  He examines the role of uncertainty  of  inflat  on, the relative price of capital, real exchange rate, the terms of trade, and GDP
growth on private investment.  For each of these variables he develops seven different measures  of uncertainty, and finds that
each measure  is negatively correlated  with privw  te investment.
5  Kormendi and Meguire (1985) andGrier and Tullock (1989) found output growth to  be positively correlated with output
fluctuations in  large cross-sections of countries. They found that this relationship was unchanged when  investment was
introduced, the implication being that uncertainty  may operate through technical progress,  although the route may equally well
be capacity utilization. Making the distinctioi between the predictable and unpredictable components of output volatility,
Ramey and Ramey (1995) show the positive  elationship between growth and volatility only holds for the variability of the
unpredictable component;  the correlation  between the unpredictable component and growth is negative and strong enough, in
fact,  to dominate  the total effect.  They also argue  that uncertainty  exerts its negative  impact on growth  mainly technical progress
or efficiency,  not investment.
9that  commodity  prices may  not be culprit.  Controlling  for  investment,  Lutz (1994)
compares the effects on growth of Net  Barter Terms of Trade and Income  Terms of
Trade  (ITT)  instability  measures.  His  two  main  findings  are  that  there  is  no
consistently  significant and robust effect of NBTT volatility on growth, and secondly
that  ITT  volatility  affects  growth  (negatively)  mainly  via volume  rather  than  price
shocks.  In other words,  it may be that  it is output rather than  price volatility  which
drives the negative growth effects in the index of Guillaumont and Chauvet (1999).
The theoretical  literature linking growth and discrete temporary trade shocks is
very limited.  The Ramsey model by Collier  and Gunning (1999a),  which formalises
the seminal  work in Bevan, Collier  and Gunning  (1990), appears  to be unique.  The
model  shows that  positive  boom income is initially  invested,  and in the post-boom
period the investment is reversed to enable a higher level of consumption.  Investment
is  therefore  the  vehicle  whereby  consumption  is  smoothed.  Consumption  is
permanently  higher than  before the boom after jumping  up at the time  of the  shock
and  then  declining  monotonically  towards  its pre-shock  level  after the  shock.  The
model  shows that  temporary trade  shocks  ought to  increase  the  level of GDP  with
accompanying  short to medium term growth effects.
Rodrik (1998) proposes a linkage from temporary trade shocks to growth via a
country's  institutional  capacity for managing conflicts. In his model, shocks give rise
to conflicts  over who  should benefit from windfalls  (in the event of positive  shocks)
and who should bear the cost of adjustment (negative shocks). In countries with strong
institutions  for conflict management,  the dominant strategy  is for competing  interests
to  cooperate.  On the  other  hand, when  conflict  management  institutions  are  weak
there are large potential returns to opportunistic behavior which makes fighting for the
spoils of (or to avoid bearing  the costs of adjustment to negative)  shocks the optimal
strategy  irrespective  of  what  other  groups  choose  to  do.  In  the  presence  of  an
intermediate  range of institutional capacity, the outcome is determined by the degree
of latent social conflicts in society.
Empirical studies of the effects of discrete ex post  shocks on growuth  are almost
as rare as their theoretical  counterparts, possibly  due to the arbitrariness  involved  in
defining  shock episodes. In the empirical part of his paper, Rodrik (1998) specifically
considers  a period  in history when many developing  countries experienced  a decline
in their  terms  of trade,  defining  his  shocks  as  the  standard  deviation  of (the  log)
10difference  of terms  of trade  over the  (1971-1980).  It  is not clear, however,  if this
variable reflects  the  downward tbend in prices at the time,  the variability  of prices,
their  uncertainty,  or  individual  episodes  of powerful  negative  price  changes.  It  is
therefore not possible to be entire'.y confident about what drives Rodrik's results.
Easterly et al. (1993) find a strong positive correlation between changes in the
terms of trade and economic growth in both the 1970s and 1980s, and they attribute as
much variation in economic  growth t6 terms of trade  shocks as to economic policies.
It  is not  clear,  however,  that  th-  dichotomy between  terms  of trade  and  policy  is
entirely  valid.  Collier  and Gunning  (1999a) point  out that  policy  changes are often
endogenous to shocks, such that the growth effect depends as much on the shock itself
and the policies  in place at the time as on the policy changes which are subsequently
made in direct response to the shock. Collier and Gunning (1  999a) consider the effects
on annual growth rates of 19 positive shock episodes over the period 1964-1991 for a
sample  of  developing  countries.  Using  a  series  of  shock  intercept  dummies,
investment-shock  interaction  dummies, and  dummies  which  capture the  post-shock
period,  they  measure the  effect  on  growth during  as well  as  after the  shock.  Their
main  finding  is that despite init al high  savings rates  windfalls  do not translate into
sustainable  increases in income; initial positive effects are more than  reversed in the
post-shock  period.  They attribut.  the reversal to a combination  of low quality public
investment  projects  and  disincentives  for  private  agents  to  lock  into their  savings
decisions on account of policy decisions taken prior to and during the shock itself. In
contrast,  Deaton  and  Miller  (1995)  who  examine  the  effects  of  commodity  price
movements  on  growth  using  a  VAR  approach  find  a  positive  coefficient  between
growth in commodity prices and  growth in income. There is therefore  disagreement
over  the  long  run  growth  imrlications  of  temporary  commodity  price  shocks.  A
consensus  reading of these stud'ies suggests that positive  shocks tend to boost growth
in the short run, but that any long run effects may depend on the policy response, the
economy's  flexibility,  institutions  for  conflict  resolution,  and  the  importance  of
commodities  in  the  country's  terms  of  trade.  Meanwhile,  the  effects  of  negative
shocks are not well-documented. Likewise, none of the papers test whether large and
small shocks and negative and positive shocks have asymmetrical effects on growth.
114. Constructing a suitable commodity price index
With  a  few  exceptions  (notably  Deaton  and  Miller  (1995)),  studies  of the
effects of commodity price movements in developing countries have been undertaken
using  either prices  of individual commodities,  terms of trade  indices,  or indices of
aggregate  commodity  price  movements  (not  country  specific).  Neither  of  these
approaches are, however, satisfactory for the following reasons:
First,  only  a  few  oil  producing  countries  are  specialized  to  the  point  of
exporting only  a single commodity,  so for the majority of developing  countries the
full ramifications of specializing in commodities cannot be determined with reference
to the  movements  in the price  series  of just  a  single commodity.  Secondly,  while
individual  commodity  prices  typically  capture  the  movements  of  too  few
commodities,  broad  terms of trade  indices arguably  capture too much  information,
including  various  non-commodity  and  non-export  price  influences; their  inclusion
present a problem mainly because it is not possible with confidence to determine if the
results are due to commodity prices  per  se.
Until recently,  it might have  been seen  as overkill to  construct commodity
prices  indices  for  individual  countries,  because  the  prices  of  even  unrelated
commodities were seen to display 'excess comovement',  which implied that there was
little  to  gain  over  using  broad  aggregates  of  commodity  prices  (Pindyck  and
Rotemberg  (1990)). However, recent work by  Cashin, McDermott and  Scott (1999)
suggests  that  much  of  the  comovement  in  unrelated  commodity  prices  can  be
accounted for mainly by extreme outliers and structural breaks, which have powerful
influences on the  correlation based  measures  of comovement  used by  Pindyck and
Rotemberg  (1990). Using a  concordance  measure, which  is insensitive  to  outliers,
Cashin, McDermott and Scott (1999) find that unrelated commodities  do not display
comovement as hitherto thought. This has a clear implication for the choice of index
used to evaluate  the effects of commodity price  movement in developing  countries:
Broad aggregate indices are likely to behave very differently from individual country
indices, especially if the country is specialized in a narrow range of commodities
The structure of the index used here is identical to the geometrically weighted
index used by Deaton and Miller (1995), namely
12DM =7Pjw  [4]
where  W is a weighting  item and  P, is the dollar international commodity price  for
the commodity  i . Dollar prices measure cif border prices. Historicalfob  prices, which
give a preferable  measure of the value of a commodity to the exporting country  are
not generally  available. The weighting  item,  W, is the value of commodity  i  in the
total value of all commodities,  n,  or the constant base period j
W 5 ;.  [5]
n
Since  WT is  country  specific,  each country's  aggregate  commodity  price  index  is
unique. As an average of the prices of the commodities  exported by each country, the
index is primarily  suited to the study of macroeconomic rather than sectoral effects. A
geometrical weighting  scheme is 'aseful for two reasons. After taking logs a geometric
index  provides  the  rate  of change  of prices  in  first  differences,  which  is  a  useful
property.  Also,  geometrically  weighted indices  avoid the numeraire  problem  which
affects  deflated  arithmetically  weighted  indices.  The  appendix  describes  the  data
sources and country coverage of the indices.
5. The distribution of temporary commodity price shocks
The  temporary  trade  shock  model  by  Collier  and  Pattillo  (2000)  is  not
restricted  to discrete shocks of a particular magnitude. Nevertheless,  most  empirical
studies of temporary trade shock 3  have focussed specifically on events associated with
large price changes (see for exarnple the collection of case studies in Collier, Gunning
and  Associates  (1999)).  There  is  therefore  a  slightly  odd  dichotomy  between  the
theoretical  treatment of shocks, which  makes no distinction  between large  and small
shocks, and the empirical analysis of shocks, which does make this distinction.
Larger  disturbances  obviously  give  rise  to  larger  absolute  annuity  values,
larger  absolute  changes  in  consumption,  and  larger  absolute  quantities  of  savings.
There  is therefore  some  intuitive  appeal  in  focusing  on  large  price  changes  to  the
13extent  that  larger effects are more likely to show up  in the data. Additionally,  there
may  be  theoretical  reasons  for  paying  particular  attention  to  large  price  changes.
Deaton  (1991) for  example  has  argued  that  large  negative  shocks  can give  rise  to
consumption  collapses  when  consumers  are  characterized  by  a  combination  of
impatience  and  precautionary  savings,  particularly  in  the  presence  of  liquidity
constraints.  This is  because  large  negative shocks  are  the  one manifestation  of the
stochastic  process  against  which  buffer  stocks  cannot  give  adequate  protection.
Secondly, agents may not treat windfall and other sources of income as fully fungible
in terms of consumption  (Thaler (1990)). Hatsopoulos, Krugman and Poterba (1989),
Summers  and  Carroll  (1987),  and  Ishikawa  and  Ueda  (1984)  show  that  marginal
propensities  to consume out of different types of wealth differ considerably.  There is
also evidence that agents assign different  consumption  propensities  according to the
magnitude  of  windfalls  (Holcomb  and  Nelson  (1989),  Horowitz  (1988),  Benzion,
Rapoport  and Yagil (1989) and Thaler (1981)). Landsberger  (1966) is an early  result
in the same vein based on a study of Israeli recipients of German restitution payments
after  World  War  II.  Thirdly,  large  and  highly  visible  shocks  may  trigger  discrete
government  interventions,  because  they  signal  new  untapped  taxation  possibilities.
Schuknecht  (1997)  has  argued,  for  example,  that  many  governments  respond  to
commodity shocks by digging deeply into the pool of rents created by increases in the
price  of commodities  in  the  1970s. Schuknecht  (1996)  shows  that higher  revenues
from  windfall  taxation  are  associated  with  higher  fiscal  deficits,  higher  current
expenditure, lower shares of health and education expenditures and lower growth.
While there  may therefore be good reasons  to examine the specific effects of
large shocks,  there are practical problems  involved in finding  a suitable definition  of
'large'.  The theoretical arguments presented above offer only limited guidance about a
suitable cut off point due to the general unobservability  of the relevant conditioning
variables.  The  second  best  solution  is  to  locate  shocks  using  a  purely  statistical
definition,  which  is consistently  applied  to  each country's  commodity  price  index.
The steps are the following: First, each country's  aggregate commodity price series is
made  stationary  by  first differencing  the series,  which  removes  the  any  permanent
innovations6. Secondly,  the  remaining  'predictable'  elements  are  removed  by
6 It is assumed that the commodity  price series are l(l) rather than trend stationary. In practice, determining  whether  a series is a
stochastic trend process or a deterministic  trend process is difficult.  See Leon and Soto (1  995).
14regressing  the differenced  series oni  its own lag, and a second lag in levels as well as a
linear time trend. This error correction specification [6] is the most efficient way to
model  an  integrated process, and  it  removes both  the  levels  and  differences
information,  which may inform  the data.
Ayi, = aO  + ait + /Ayi,, 1 + AYi±,-2  + £j,;  [6]
The residuals from [6], ei,, are normalized  by subtracting the mean and dividing by
the standard deviation, and finally an extreme but essentially arbitrary cut off point
can be applied to the stationary  normalized  residuals.  The base case cut off point used
here puts 2.5% of the observations  into each tail region.
A total of  179 positive and 99 negative shocks were found in  this data,
constituting  4.06% and 2.25% of the total number of observations,  respectively.  The
disproportionate  number of posilive shocks is consistent with the predictions of the
competitive  storage model propcsed by Deaton and Laroque (1992). Figure 3 and 4
show the distribution of positive and  negative shocks  over the period 1957 to 1997  for
10 different  cut off points in the xange  of 1%-10%.  It is evident from these figures that
shocks do not appear to be distributed  randomly across time. The incidence  of shocks
is low prior to the 1970s, and then suddenly increases dramatically  with close to 1/3
of all countries in the sample experiencing positive shocks across several years,
notably in the 1970s. The inciclence  of positive shocks then declines, but remains
higher than in the period prior to  the 1970s. This pattern is consistent with the
findings of Love (1989) who cLlculates  estimates of mean variability of commodity
prices in 65 developing countries over the two periods 1960-1971 and 1972-1984.
Love  finds  that  instability inareased in  the  latter  period using  three  different
deterministic  trend specifications  (linear, exponential,  and moving average). It is also
evident that the incidence of negative shocks increased in the 1970s, although the
numbers of shocks  are always smaller  than those for positive shocks.  Negative shocks
are particularly prevalent  in the 1980s  and 1990s.
It is not the objective  of this paper to explain the uneven  temporal distribution
of shocks. It is important,  however,  to establish  that the high concurrence  of shocks in
some years is not attributable  tc some specific factors  such as oil price movements,  or
15the  choice  of  deflator. Consider first  the  role of  oil.  A  total  of  59  countries
experienced shocks in either 1973 or 1974 (the oil shock year), which is more than
twice the number of countries in the sample, which exports oil (23 countries). The
negative shock in 1986 could also be construed as a product of the collapse in oil
prices, but again a large number of non-oil exporting countries saw shocks in that
year. The fact that the 1979 shock is exclusive to oil producers also suggest that the
price changes for other commodities  in 1974 and 1986 were not indirectly due to oil
either. Clearly, oil is not the whole story.
All indices are deflated by the same deflator; the MUV index. It is therefore
possible that the similarities in the distribution  of shocks  across different countries  are
due to  specific outliers in the common deflator. Closer inspection of the deflator,
however, reveals that its volatility is much smaller than the volatility of commodity
prices, usually by a factor between 2 and 5 depending  on the time period and choice
countries. The differences are significant  at the 1% level. Even in the critical year of
1986, where the MUV index has an upwards kink which could potentially account for
the high incidence of negative shocks in  the commodity price indices, the price
change in the deflator is a mere 11.3%  compared  to 49.5% for the 40 country's whose
aggregate indices experienced negative shocks in  that year. Indeed, the  average
magnitude of price changes in each of the 10 commodities,  which saw outliers was
51.6% in that year 7. It therefore seems fairly certain that the high incidence of shocks
in particular years reflects instability in many commodities  rather than oil shocks or
deflator shocks.
6. Commodity price uncertainty in developing countries
Uncertainty  can be measured  in many different ways, and there is no consensus
on what constitutes the 'correct' method of measurement. The lack of consensus
suggests that there is merit in considering  more than one measure, and we therefore
consider  three broad alternative  approaches  to measuring  uncertainty.
The naYve  approach involves treating all price movements as indicative of
uncertainty  by calculating  the standard  deviation  each country's aggregate  commodity
price index. This is unsatisfactory  on a number of counts. Most importantly, it does
'The  standard deviations were small at 3.1% for the country shocks and 5.0% for the commodity  shocks.
16not control for the predictable cornponents aiid trends in the price evolution process,
and is therefore  likely to overstate uncertainty. Both Ramey and Ramey (1995) and
Serven (1998) have shown and argued that this distinction is important.
The  second  approach  distinguishes  between  predictable  and  unpredictable
components of the price series, bat remains time invariant. The measure is based on
the principle proposed by Ramey ,md Ramey (1995) that the 'predictable'  components
of the price  series  can be modeled using  a  selection of explanatory variables.  The
variance of the residuals can then be thought of as uncertainty. However, in contrast to
Ramey  and  Ramey  (1995),  we  do  not  regress  commodity  prices  on  a  series  of
explarnatory variables, but  adopt  instead a  time  series  approach, whereby  the first
difference of real commodity prices (in logs) is regressed on its first lag, the second
lag in levels (making the regression akin to an error correction specification) plus a
quadratic trend, and quarterly durmmies:
Ay,  =  -a  + at  + a2 t'  + AAyi  ,-, t Ayiy- 2 +y 1D, + -,;
t = 1...,  T;
[71
The three quarterly dummies, D,, take the value of 1 for the second, third, and fourth
quarters, respectively, zero otherxise. The constant captures the base period intercept.
This  approach treats as predictable  the parameters  on the trend, quarterly  dummies,
and lagged differences and level:, of the dependent variable, which can be justified by
thinking  of past  values and  tre ads as being accumulated  as knowledge  by  agents,
wherefore uncertainty estimates must purge these known priors.
Cashin, Liang and McDermott (1999) argue that uncertainty worsened during
the  1970s.  If this  is so,  it  is clearly  not appropriate  to  impose  an  assumption  of
homoskedasticity upon the variance of the residuals. The third approach to measuring
uncertainty  therefore  distinguishes not  only between  predictable  and  unpredictable
components of prices, but also allows the variance of the unpredictable element to be
time  varying.  Time varying  conditional  variances  can  be estimated by  applying  a
Generalized Autoregressive Coniditional  Heteroskedasticity  (GARCH) model to each
country's  aggregate commodity price index (Bollerslev (1986)). We use a univariate
GARCH(1,1) specification sim,ar  to that adopted by  Serven (1998) which we apply
uniformly across countries. We therefore estimate, for each country,
17Ay,t  =  aO +  -at  +a 2t2 +/4Ayj,,  + AYi,,-2 + ) 7 ID, +  j,,;
t=l...,  T;  [8]
0,2  =,,io  +7',gr-  +),i2,__
where  o;2 denotes the variance of  £,  conditional upon information up to period.  The
fitted values of  (7i,  are the measure of uncertainty of  y,,.  Quarterly dummies,  D1,
were included to remove possible detenninistic seasonal influences on the conditional
variance.  Each  quarterly dummy  takes  a  value  of  1 for  a  particular quarter,  zero
otherwise, and the final quarter is catered for by the constant term.
Large  shocks  may  dominate  both  the  time  invariant  and  time  varying
uncertainty  measures,  but  it  is  possible  that  agents  view  such  large  shocks  as
sufficiently  infrequent  and  atypical  to  effectively  discount  them  when  they  form
estimates  about  future price  uncertainty.  Versions  of the  Ramey  and  Ramey  and
GARCH  uncertainty measures  were therefore  also constructed  which  'dummy  out'
particular events. The six uncertainty measures are summarized in Table 1.
Table  2  shows  average  uncertainty  for  different  groups  of  countries  over
different periods of time for each uncertainty measure. The columns labeled 'I'  to 'VI'
correspond to the six uncertainty measures in Table 1. The first line in Table 2 shows
the average commodity  price uncertainty  for the full 113 countries  sample.  Evidently,
these highly aggregated  statistics do not differ a great deal between  the Ramey and
Ramey and GARCH based measures,  which both record a standard deviation  in the
range of 0.6-0.8. In contrast, the standard  deviation  measure,  which does not remove
'predictable' elements  from the price series, is several times larger than either of the
measures,  which do remove predictable  elements.  This underlines  the point made by
both Ramey and Ramey (1995) and  Serven (1998) that the distinction between
uncertainty and  variability is  an  important one; the large  discrepancy between
uncertainty measures  which do and do not control for predictable  elements suggests
that much of the movement  in the price series reflects 'predictable' changes such as
autoregressive paramneters  and trends, and failure to account for these components
leads to considerable  overstatements  of actual  uncertainty.
18The second block of statistics in Table 2 shows average uncertainty by broad
regional  grouping  calculated over the full sample period  (1957-1997).  According to
the  uncertainty  measures,  which  do  not control for  shocks  ('I',  'IV'  and  'VI')  the
region,  which  faces by  far the most commodity price uncertainty  is the Middle  East
and North  Africa. Among  the reinaining regional  groups, there is little difference in
commodity price uncertainty. This includes Sub-Saharan African countries, which do
not appear to experience more uncertainty on average than other developing  countries.
To  the  extent  that  the  commodity  share  of  total  exports  is  greater  for  African
countries,  the  same  level of uncertainty  will of course  have  greater effects,  ceteris
paribus.  When controlling  for shocks, the difference in uncertainty  between  Middle
Eastern and North African countiies  on the one hand and other regional  groups on the
other diminishes  considerably for the GARCH measures  ('II',  'III').  The Ramey and
Ramey measure ('V')  does not ciange,  however, which is probably because the trend
break allowed for in this measure is a poor control for the first oil shock.
The  third  block  of  data  in  Table  2  splits  the  sample  by  time  period  in
accordance  with  oil price  movements  (1958-1972;  1973-1985;  1986-1997).  On  all
measures, uncertainty  is higher  in the  1973-1985 and  1986-1997 periods than  in the
period from 1957-1972. On most measures, the increase in uncertainty  is as much as
100%. There is no consistent  evidence that uncertainty  falls in the  1986-1997 period
relative to the 1973-1985 period. Indeed, depending on the measure used, uncertainty
is  in some  cases  higher in  the  1986-1997  period than  in the  1973-1985  period.  It
would  therefore  appear that uncertainty  rose in the  1970s and has  not subsequently
declined.  Moreover,  since  this  increase  is  also  evident  in  the  measures,  which
specifically  control for outliers the rise in uncertainty cannot be attributed exclusively
to a few extreme outliers.
The  final eight  blocks  of data  in Table  2  show uncertainty  for  each regional
group, by  time period.  Except for  South Africa,  uncertainty  increased in  all regions
after  1973 and increased  further in East Asia and the Caribbean after  1986. In  Sub-
Saharan Africa,  South Asia,  and the Pacific economies  uncertainty  fell slightly  after
1986, while in the Middle East. and North Africa and in Latin America  the outcome
depends on the specific uncertainty measure used.
Producers  of different types of commodities  may be prone  to uncertainty  for
different  reasons, and their experience of uncertainty  may therefore be different. For
19example,  agricultural  commodities  are  widely  regarded  as  more  prone  to  weather
shocks, while non-food products by virtue of not being consumer  goods may be more
prone  to business  cycles. Oil is often best treated on its own. On these grounds, it is
insightful to  split the  sample into agricultural  food producers,  agricultural  non-food
producers, non-agricultural  non-oil producers, and oil producers. Countries are labeled
as exporters of a particular type of commodity if their exports of that particular type of
commodity  constitute  50%  or  more  of  total  commodity  exports.  If  no  single
commodity  type  accounts  for  50% of  exports  the  country  was  labeled  a  'mixed'
exporter.  Table  3 shows average uncertainty  by producer type.  It is evident that  oil
producers  face by  far the most uncertain prices on  most measures.  The exception  is
the  GARCH  measure  ('III'),  which  controls  for  all  shocks,  although  the  other
measures  which  partly  control  for  shocks  ('II',  'III',  and  'V')  also  indicate  that
uncertainty is considerably reduced by controlling for outliers.' The implication is that
the bulk of uncertainty in these countries is accounted for mainly  by discrete shocks.
Meanwhile,  there  is  very  little  to  separate  uncertainty  measures  for  the  remaining
three  producer types,  although it is noticeable that  mixed producers  appear  to have
equivalent  or lower uncertainty than all other non-oil producers in the  1973-1985 and
1986-1997 periods according to those measures, which do not control for shocks  ('I,'
'IV'  and 'VI').  Over the full sample period, the uncertainty faced by mixed producers
is equal to or lower than uncertainty in all other regions. Finally, uncertainty tends to
be higher  during  the  1973-1985 period  than  in  the preceding  period,  and  in many
cases  remains  at this  higher level  into the  1986-1997 period.  Hence,  regardless  of
whether  we disaggregate  by region or by commodity producer type there  appears  to
have been a sustained increase in uncertainty since the early  1970s.
7. The empirical growth model
This section describes the approach which will be used evaluate if and how the
uneven distribution  of discrete shocks and the increase in uncertainty since the 1970s
have  impacted  growth  rates  in  developing  countries.  The  approach  involves
augmenting  a  canonical  empirical  growth equation  with  suitably  defined  variables.
Our approach departs  from recent work  by Guillaumont  and Chauvet  (1999)  in two
'Since the oil producers are  primarily  from  the Middle  East  and  North Africa, this explains  why this group of countries faced the
20important  regards.  First,  an  established  empirical  growth  model  is  used  as  the
canonical basis for the empirical analysis. Since the choice of explanatory variables in
the Burnside and Dollar (1997) growth model encapsulates what are regarded as the
key empirical  determinants of growth in the literature, the use of this model enables
more  direct  comparison  of our  results with  other  papers  in the  growth literature.
Secondly,  the uncertainty  and  shocks  variables are different  from  the vulnerability
index used by  Guillaumont  and Chauvet (1999) which is  a composite index which
picks up not only terms of trade shocks, but also the effects of ecological shocks on
agricultural  output,  changes  in  the  trend  in  terms  of  trade,  and  the  economy's
structural exposure  to these  types of shocks. In contrast,  the measure  used here  is
based  entirely on  commodity prices. In estimating  a full growth model, the present
analysis  also goes considerably further than  Deaton (1999), who  only considers the
simple correlation between comrm[odity  prices and growth.
The canonical specification has the following arguments:
g,G  = f (YO,  X)  [9]
where  the  matrices  {Y 0, X}  respectively  denote  initial  conditions,  and  canonical
regressors.  Two  time  invarying  variables  capture  initial  conditions,  namely  the
institutional quality index constructed by Knack and Keefer (1995), which measures
the security of property rights and efficiency of the government bureaucracy, and the
ethnolinguistic  fractionalization  index  which  has  been  shown  to  be  an  important
determinant of growth by Easterly and Levine (1997).
The time varying variables include the log of real GDP in the beginning of each
growth  epoch,  which  is  included  to  capture convergence  effects, and  the  ratio  of
money  supply (M2) to GDP, which proxies for development of the financial system
(King  and  Levine  (1993)).  The  latter  is  lagged  one  period to  avoid  endogeneity
problems.  To  capture  political  instability  effects,  a  variable,  which  measures
assassinations  is  included,  and  this  variable  is  also  interacted  with  the  ethnic
fractionalization index. Finally.  Sub-Saharan Africa and East  Asia dummy variables
greater uncertainty  in Table 2.
21are  included  to  capture  the  sharply contrasting  growth performances  of these  two
regions.
Instead  of using  a range of policy  indicators, the policy  incentive regime  is
modeled  using the policy index produced by Burnside and Dollar (1997). This index
is constructed  as a product  of the coefficients of the relevant policy  variables  in a
growth regression and the means of these variables. Their specification is:
Policy=1.28 + 6.85 Budget surplus -1.40 Inflation +2.16 Openness
where  the  constant  is scaled to  ensure  that  the mean  of the  policy  index  and  the
dependent variable are identical. This index has been criticized on the grounds that it
does  not  capture  what  constitutes  'good  policies'  (Lensink  and  White  (2000)).
However, the particular choice of variables for inclusion in a policy index is always
bound  to  be  controversial.  A  strong argument  for  using  the  Burnside  and  Dollar
(1997) policy variable is its very impressive explanatory power in regressions.
The  key  objective is  to explore  whether and  how  commodity  prices  affect
growth.  Various  different  manifestations  of  commodity  price  movements  may
potentially affect growth, and it is important not to prejudice the analysis by excluding
any  of these a priori.  We therefore consider a full range of specifications. First, we
use  the  log of  real  commodity  prices  in  levels  as  a  potential  regressor,  because
commodity  prices in  levels  may matter  to  growth.  A  levels  measure  may  also  be
important if, say, the effects of shocks and uncertainty are conditional upon the level
of commodity prices. Secondly, the first difference of (log) commodity prices can be
thought  of as a base case variable, because this variable encompasses the large price
changes which form the basis for the shock variable. In particular, the first difference
of log commodity prices can be seen as a variable, which imposes an assumption of
symmetry  between  positive  and negative  price  movements,  and  between large  and
small price changes. Thirdly, interaction terms are introduced to enable distinctions to
be made between large and small commodity price changes, and between positive and
negative  price  changes. Large price  changes - shocks  - are identified in accordance
with the methodology described in Section 6.5. Finally, the full range of commodity
price  uncertainty measures  described in Section  6.6 are tested for  their explanatory
power in the growth regression.
22A shocks is modelled as year-specific dummy, which presents a problem in the
context of estimating  a growth panel whose epoch time  dimension spans more than
one year. The shock variable theiefore has to be redefined to  suit the panel context.
The new  shock  variable  takes  a value  of unity  if a  shock  occurs  in  the  epoch as
opposed to a particular year, zero otherwise. Clearly, the length of the epoch used in
the growth regression is of considerable importance. For example, if growth rates are
calculated  over the  full 1970-1993 sample period, the  shock variables  will become
near meaningless, because most countries experienced at least one positive or negative
shock during this time, wherefore the shock variable would be indistinguishable from
the constant. In the Bumside and Dollar (1997) growth panel, however,  this is not a
problem, since the growth epochs are only 4 years long.
8. Estimation  issues
Estimation of a panel growth equation with policy variables introduces at least
two potential estimation issues, namely country specific effects and endogeneity. This
section briefly discusses each in tam.
A  number  of  methods  exist  for  coping  with  unobserved  country  specific
effects in static panels. When country specific effects are present, they will give rise to
omitted variable bias (OVB) in a pooled OLS regression. One way to avoid OVB is to
include  a  set  of n-i  country  specific  intercept  dummy  variables  (LSDV  model).
However, given that the sample consists of a mere 275 observations in the preferred
specification, the inclusion of 55 additional parameters puts a serious drain on degrees
of freedom. An alternative way to deal with the problem is to use the Fixed Effects
(Within  Groups)  estimator,  which  sweeps  out  any  country  specific  effects  by
subtracting the mean from each variable, although this also means that the variables
which  capture  initial  conditions; in  the  equation  drop  out  along  with  the  country
specific effects.
Here,  we  shall  estimate  pooled  OLS  and  FE(WG)  models  and  perform
Hausman tests across the specifications to check if there are gains in moving from the
former to the latter. We shall also use a Hausman test to determine if country specific
effects are best modeled as random or fixed.
23Issues of endogeneity are potentially very important - see Bumside and Dollar
(1997), Guillaumont  and Chauvet (1999), and especially  Hansen and  Tarp (1999b).
Both the policy variable and the investment variable (when included) are likely to be
determined  by  growth  itself.  For example,  supply  shocks  such as  droughts  cause
incomes, and therefore growth, to fall. If the fall in income causes policy to worsen,
the result is that policy is positively correlated with the error term, and the coefficient
will be biased.
Deaton  and  Miller  (1995)  and  Collier  and  Gunning  (1999a)  estimate  the
effects of various commodity price manifestations on GDP and annual growth rates,
respectively.  They  both  include  investment  as  a  regressor,  but  they  are  at  near
opposite extremes in terms  of their treatment of endogeneity  issues. In the spirit of
Sims (1980), the VAR of Deaton and Miller treats all variables symmetrically by not
imposing  any prior assumptions  of endogeneity  and exogeneity  (except commodity
prices which are treated as exogenous). In contrast, Collier and Gunning (1999a) treat
growth as endogenous and investment rates as exogenous.  The possible endogeneity
of investment to growth is therefore not taken into account.
Arguably, neither of these approaches are ideal. The VAR analysis produces
inefficient  estimates  and  is  not  well  suited  for  estimating  long  run  effects,  and
ignoring  endogeneity  can  hardly  be  recommended  either.  Alternative  approaches
involve  simultaneous  equation  estimation, or instrumental  variable estimation  (IV).
Simultaneous  equation  methods  typically  involve  the  introduction  of  other
explanatory  variables  for  purposes  of  identification,  which  themselves  may  be
endogenous, which in turn means that more equations and more variables are needed,
and  so  on.  The methodology  favored  here  is therefore  the  instrumental  variable
method,  which  strikes a balance by  correcting for the potential  bias  in the Collier-
Gunning paper  dealing with the potential  endogeneity problem,  while avoiding  the
inefficiency of VAR estimation.
IV techniques require that instruments be found which are correlated with the
endogenous  variable, but uncorrelated with the  error term.  A  full range  of external
instruments  is  provided  in  the  Burnside  Dollar  data.  As  an  alternative  to  the
conventional  instrumental  variable estimation approach to dealing with endogeneity,
however,  we  also  carry out the  Systems GMM  analysis proposed  by  Blundell  and
24Bond (1998), which uses internally generated instruments to  instrument for both
policy and, as part of our robustness  analysis,  for investment.
The sample consists of 56 countries over the period 1970/1973  to 1990/93.  The
data is an unbalanced  panel with a maximum  of six growth observations  per country.
9. Results
In this section,  we present a progression  of results leading towards a preferred
model specification.  Several regressions are reported in order to illustrate what does
not work. This is of some interest, because one of the objectives  is to establish which
among the competing manifestations  of commodity price variability actually affect
growth. We then test the robustne:,s  of the preferred  model specification  to changes  in
sample size, estimation  methods,  time series dimension,  and equation specification.
In regression 1 of Table 4, we report  the canonical  growth specification,  which
is identical in all respects to the canonical model reported in Burnside and Dollar
(1997). The most important  determinants  of growth  in the canonical  model are policy
and  institutional  quality.  Ethnolinguistic  fractionalization  interacted  with
assassinations is also significant  as is the Sub-Saharan  Africa dummy. In regressions
2, 3, and 4 we augment the canDnical  model with the log of commodity prices in
levels and differences, and the positive and negative shock dummies, respectively.
These regressions are carried out to give a basic flavor of how commodity prices
affect growth, if at all. It is evident from regressions  2 and 3 that there is no simple
strong statistical relationship either between the log of the real commodity price in
levels or its difference  (which is also the annual growth rate since the levels variable
upon which it is based is in logs). In regression 4, we enter the positive and negative
shock dummies, which, it is recalled, indicate episodes of 'large'  changes in (log)
commodity  prices. In contrast to the simple levels and differences specifications,  the
negative shock dummy enters the growth regression with a  significant negative
coefficient. The positive shock dummy is  not  significant. This  provides a  first
indication that there may be asymmetrical  effects in terms of how commodity price
changes affect growth. However, since both the positive and negative shock dummy
impose an untested restriction  that smaller commodity  price changes do not matter to
growth, it is not clear if the significance  of the negative shock dummy indicates  that
25large negative commodity  price changes have asymmetric  effects from smaller price
changes, or whether all negative commodity  price changes would have this effect on
growth.
In order to determine if positive and negative price changes have different
effects on growth and whether the effects are sensitive to the magnitude of the price
changes, we ran a new set of regressions  shown in Table 5. Regression 1 in Table 5
splits the first difference  of the log of real commodity  prices into positive and negative
changes, thus no  longer imposing the assumption of symmetry for positive and
negative price changes. It is clear that negative price changes have a  significant
negative effect on growth rates, while again positive price changes do not appear to
matter. In terms of growth, positive and negative price changes therefore have very
different effects.
The remaining question is now whether the significant coefficient on the
negative price changes variable is driven by large shocks or small commodity  price
changes, or  indeed by  both. This question can be  answered by  introducing an
interaction term between the negative shocks dummy and the negative changes in
commodity prices (regression  2). The interaction  term between the shock dummy and
the  change in  commodity prices enables large  and  small price  changes to  be
distinguished in terms of their effects on growth. It is very clear from this regression
that it is large negative  price changes,  which matter  rather than negative  price changes
per  se.  We also tested whether the coefficients on these variables were equal in
magnitude,  but opposite in sign, which would imply that the coefficient on the shock
interaction term is zero. This was firmly rejected at the 99% confidence level (F(1,
258)=12.34)).  Meanwhile,  when a similar decomposition  was carried out for positive
shocks, it was not possible to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the
positive shock interaction term was identical but of opposite sign to the positive
changes in prices base variable (F(1,256)=0.06)).  This means that large and small
positive shocks do not have different effects on growth, indeed, they do not appear to
have any effects at all. Finally, a test was carried out to verify that positive price
changes on the one hand and the disaggregated  negative  price changes  on the other are
statistically distinct in  their  effect  on  growth. This  was validated  at  the  5%
significance  level (F(1,257)=4.08).  On the basis of these tests, it is therefore possible
to conclude that statistically speaking commodity prices have highly asymmetrical
26effects  on  growth  in  terms  of  both  magnitude  and  direction.  In  particular,  only
negative  changes  appear  to  matter  to  growth,  and  within  this  subset  only  large
negative changes appear to matter,
Shocks  are  'large'  price  changes, and they  can,  by  virtue  of the  stochastic
process, which  determines their incidence, occur at any point  in time. They can for
example occur at a time when the level of commodity prices is historically low, or
indeed when commodity prices are already high. It might be hypothesized that a large
negative shock is more  growth reducing when  it occurs at  a time when commodity
prices are already low. This does not appear to be the case, however. In regression 3,
we interact the negative shock interaction term with the log of real commodity prices,
but this variable  is insignificant.  The implication is that negative shocks exert  their
negative  influence  on  growth  regardless  of  whether  they  occur  when  epoch
commodity prices are on average high or low. It  should be borne in mind, however,
that this test is likely to be weak because of the use of epoch averages of the levels
variable. For example, the shock may have occurred during a particular year, when the
level of commodity prices was indeed low by historical standards, which accounts for
the  large effect  on  growth,  but  the epoch  average of  the  level  variable  is a  poor
estimator of the price level in the critical year.
In regression 4, we include both negative changes in prices, negative changes
interacted with the negative shock dummy, and the negative  shock dummy itself  to
capture  any  intercept  effects. It  is  evident  from  this  regression  that  the  intercept
dummy  and the  negative price  vhanges are  not significant after  controlling for  the
interaction between the negative shock dummy and large price changes. This suggests
that the effect is confined to the interaction term. Thus, in regression 5, we present our
preferred model,  where  the insignificant  positive  price  changes, the  small  negative
price  changes,  and the  intercep:  shock  dummies have  been  dropped.  The negative
shocks interaction term is signifi=ant at the 99% confidence level, and exercises a very
considerable  negative  effect  on  growth.  To  illustrate the  magnitude  of this  effect,
consider the first row of numbers in Table 6. Given the estimated beta coefficient of -
62.463 from the  preferred regression,  the mean  of the  change in commodity prices
during shocks of 0.025, and the mean of the dependent variable of 1.17, the elasticity
of growth with respect to changes in price can easily be evaluated conditional upon a
large shock having occurred. At the mean, the growth elasticity is -1.345. Evaluated at
27two  standard  deviations  above  the  mean,  the  growth  elasticity  is  -2.876,  while
evaluated at one standard deviation below the mean the growth elasticity is -0.580.
Elasticities  were also calculated for negative commodity price  changes more
generally and  for negative commodities price changes net of shocks (respectively the
2nd and 3rd rows in Table 6). Although these elasticities are also substantial, they  are
smaller than for shocks, which is supportive of asymmetric effects from large shocks.
Moreover,  it should be remembered  that the coefficients upon  which they  are based
are statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Two conclusions  can be drawn from these results. Firstly, negative shocks-are
important  due to their large growth elasticities. Secondly, the fact that the elasticity is
very  different  depending  on  whether it  is evaluated at,  above,  or below  the  mean
shows that, conditional upon a shock having occurred, the bigger the shock the more
severe its effect. Indeed, elasticities of this magnitude are supportive of the hypothesis
proposed by Rodrik (1998) that negative shocks can cause growth collapses, although
we are not at liberty on the basis of the information presented so far to evaluate if, as
Rodrik  suggests, the mechanism  whereby these  collapses occur is via poor  conflict
resolution.  However,  it  is  clear  from the  regressions  that  negative  shocks  remain
highly  significant  even  when  the  canonical  model  includes  ethnolinguistic
fractionalization and institutional quality variables. This is interesting, because in his
growth  regressions,  Rodrik  (1998)  finds  that  negative  shocks  cease  to  have  a
significant effect on growth when these variables are introduced. Rodrik interprets the
sudden insignificance of the shock variable upon the introduction of the institutional
variables as indicative of the importance of social structures of conflict resolution  in
ensuring that shocks have beneficial effects on growth. Our results suggest a different
interpretation  of Rodrik's  results,  namely that  changes  in terms  of trade,  and  their
standard  deviation  may  be  poor  instruments  for  large  negative  shocks,  which  are
therefore not robust to the inclusion of other standard growth regressors. Thus, while
social conditions may still matter in the way that Rodrik suggests negative shocks can
clearly precipitate growth collapses even after controlling for social conditions.
A natural next step is to evaluate the robustness of these findings along several
different  dimensions.  First,  we  examine  the  impact  of  changing  the  sample  of
countries.  Table  7 reports  OLS  estimates  of the preferred  model  for  four different
sample  specifications.  Regression  I  excludes  the  five  observations  identified  as
28outliers  by  Burnside and Dollar (I 997). It is clear from the results that while these
countries may be outliers in terms of how aid have  affected their growth rates, their
inclusion clearly does not alter the shock coefficient in the shock augmented growth
equation.
A more serious concern is ihe role of oil shocks, although typically one thinks
of positive  shocks  in this  context, However, oil prices dropped  dramatically  in the
1980s and it is important to checkc  whether the results are not simply driven by the
decline in the price of oil. Regression 2 therefore excludes  oil producers defined  as
countries for which oil constitutes 50% or more  of total commodity exports. While
magnitude of the coefficient is reduced somewhat by their exclusion, negative shocks
are still highly significant when oil producers are omitted from the sample. This is a
strong indicator that the shock results are not driven by oil shocks alone.
Another  interesting  question  is whether  negative  shocks  affect  the  poorest
countries in the world, because the welfare implications of a fall in growth rates are
arguably more  serious in the poorest countries, where people live closer to absolute
destitution.  Regression  3  therefore  additionally  omits  countries  whose income  per
capita  in  1970 was above US$1900  in constant  1985 US Dollars. This reduces  the
sample to 60% of the original sanple  size, wherefore the efficiency of the estimates
declines  considerably.  The  coefficient  on  negative  shocks  is  nevertheless  still
significant at the 10% level, and c  f the same order of magnitude as for the full sample.
Finally, we ran the preferred model on a sample consisting of just Sub-Saharan
African countries (regression 4). This reduced the sample to just 84 observations, and
predictably the t statistic on the negative shock term is now only 1.52 (corresponding
to a p value of 13%). Again, however, the magnitude of the coefficient is close to the
previous estimates. Taking into account the small sample size, it would seem that the
effect of negative shocks on growth is quite robust to changes in sample composition,
and particularly relevant in the poorest developing countries.
A second dimension of robustness testing concerns the method of estimation,
In  estimating  our  preferred  specification using  a  pooled  OLS  estimator,  we  have
implicitly  assumed that pooling across countries is valid so long as we include Sub-
Saharan  African  and  East  Asi,an dummies.  However,  it  is  possible  that  the  bias
introduced by not allowing for ir,dividual country specific effects is sufficiently strong
to  give  grounds  for concern.  The  other concern  is endogeneity.  The  pooled  OLS
29model treats all right hand side variables as exogenous, although the policy variable in
particular may well be endogenous. If this is the case, the result is that coefficients in
the preferred specification are both biased and inconsistent. Table 8 reports a number
of regressions, which use different estimation methods to control for country specific
effects and endogeneity. Country specific effects may be modeled as random or fixed
effects.  Regression  I  reports the preferred model  estimated using  a random  effects
model.  It  is worth  noticing that  the  coefficient  on  the  negative  shock  variable  is
entirely  stable  in the  face of this  change in estimation  methodology,  although  the
random  effects model  is not the preferred  estimator. This  is evident from the  Chi-
squared  test  statistic  of  5.71 which  fails to  reject null of  the Hausman  test  of no
systematic  difference  in coefficients in this  model and  a fixed effects within  group
estimator  (FE(WG)). Hence,  there are efficiency  gains to considering  an estimator,
which allows for fixed country specific effects.
One way to do this is to is to transform the variable by subtracting their means.
This  sweeps  out the  country specific  effects, but also  the time  invariant variables,
which  capture  initial  conditions.  Regression  2  reports  the  FE(WG)  estimates  and
shows that the  negative shock variable  is robust to the  transformation  and remains
significant  at  the 5%  level. The country  specific effects  are not jointly  significant
according  to  the  F  test  (F(55,208)=1.25),  but  this  does not  mean  that  individual
coefficients are not different from zero, and hence potentially a source of bias. What is
important  is whether  such biases  are sufficiently  important  to produce  systematic
differences in the coefficients between a model, which accounts for them, and one that
does  not.  The  effect  on  the  beta  coefficients  can  be  determined  by  applying  a
Hausman test to a FE(WG) model against the OLS alternative. The test is unable to
reject the null that the beta coefficients for the FE(WG) are indistinguishable from the
OLS model (Chi-squared test of 10.50). We therefore take this to suggest that the OLS
model  is  not strongly  biased by  the  omission  of country  specific effects  for  each
individual country.
Regression 3 reports an estimate of the preferred model using Two Stage Least
Squares  (TSLS) instrumenting for policy. Burnside and Dollar (1997) argue that the
policy  variable can be regarded as exogenous, which  is extremely  convenient given
the difficulties in finding good instruments for policy. However, we elected to take the
endogeneity issue more seriously. First, we constructed a set of instruments composed
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with the  Sachs-Warner openness  index. The argument  for using  the  Sachs-Warner
openness index as an instrument fox policy despite the fact that this variable is actually
part of the policy index itself is the following: Unlike the budget deficit and inflation,
which  make  up  the  other  compoilents  of  the policy  index,  the  openness  variable
captures discrete trade policy changes, and therefore does not adjust continuously  to
income shocks. Regression 3 shows that these instruments predictably perform  well,
because policy remains highly signiificant. Conditional  upon the Sachs-Warner index
being genuinely exogenous, the result appears to vindicate the assumption maintained
in Burnside and Dollar (1997) that the policy variable is indeed exogenous, since there
are no notable differences in the size and significance of coefficient on the negative
shock  variable  compared  to  the  OLS  estimate.  The  other  coefficients  are  also
statistically unchanged by instrumentation as indicated by the Hausman test, which is
unable to reject the model treating all variables  as exogenous  in favor of the TSLS
model (Chi-squared test statistic is 0.00).
However, the close similarity between the OLS and TSLS model may simply
reflect  that  the  correlation  coefficient  between  the  instrument,  the  Sachs-Warner
index,  and  the  instrumented  policy  variable  is  high  (0.78).  The  key  question  is
whether  the  Sachs-Warner  index  should be  treated  as  exogenous.  This  is  a  valid
question since the index is partly a function  of the black market premium, which  is
arguably endogencus.  More fundamentally, Collier and  Gunning (1999a) argue that
discrete  trade  policy  measures  may  to  all  intents  and  purposes  be  endogenous  to
shocks, which therefore puts a further question mark over the validity of treating the
Sachs-Warner  index as exogenouls, even if we ignore the issue of the black  market
premium.  In order to deal with this  potential endogeneity problem, we therefore re-
estimated the preferred model using the SYS-GMM estimator of Blundell  and Bond
(1998).  By jointly  estimating bcth  levels and differenced equations, the SYS-GMM
estimator  solves  the  problem  of  the  Nickell  bias  through  an  Anderson-Hsiao
differencing  transformation, while simultaneously finding an efficient solution to the
endogeneity problem by using internally generated lagged instruments which exploit
all available moment restrictions. In addition to the policy variable, which we treat as
endogenous,  we  also allow  for  both  initial  income  and the  financial  development
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observations per country, which reduces the sample size from 275 to 234 observations
and from 56 to 40 countries. The results are reported in regression 4 and shows that
the policy  index is  still significant.  More importantly,  the negative  shock  variable
remains  significant  (5% level).  The coefficients  on  both the  policy  index  and  the
shock  variable  are smaller, which  perhaps indicates that there  is some  bias  due to
endogeneity  in  the  OLS regressions. The Sargan test  for the  SYS-GMM estimates
does not reject that the instruments are optimal for this regression, although there  is
some evidence of first order serial correlation.
The third and fourth dimensions of robustness, which  we examine pertain  to
the stability of the coefficients over time, and the sensitivity of the coefficients to the
inclusion  of investment  in the  growth equation.  Regarding  stability  of coefficients
over time, two issues are of importance: First, are the coefficients the same in the first
half of the sample period as in the second half? Given that the panel covers the period
from  1970-1993, a split in the middle  (corresponding to  1981/1982) may  be telling
because the  1970s was a period of unusually many positive  shocks, while the 1980s
saw mostly negative shocks. Both periods also saw marked changes in uncertainty. In
addition, in the second period many developing countries found themselves unable to
borrow on intemational  capital markets due to the debt crisis. It is therefore possible
that negative shocks are not a general problem, but one that is specifically attributable
to events, which occurred in the 1982-1993 period. The first two regressions in Table
9 report estimates  of the preferred model for observations  up to and including  1981
(growth epochs  1970-73, 1974-77, 1978-81) and the remaining growth epochs (1982-
85,  1986-89,  and  1990-1993),  respectively.  These  regressions  show  that  the
coefficient  on negative shocks for the latter half of the sample is indeed greater than
that the coefficient in the earlier period as one would expect, but negative shocks also
have  a  considerable  and  significant  effect  on  growth  in  the  1970s,  which  saw
predominantly  positive  shocks. In other words, the growth implications  of negative
shocks are clearly  neither a decade specific phenomenon, nor a specific ramification
of the debt crisis.
9 Pre-determined  variables  are  variables,  whose  current  values  are  correlated  with past  shocks,  but  not with current  and  future
errors.  Valid instruments  for pre-determined  variables  include  regressors  lagged  one  period  or more.  Endogenous  variables  are
variables,  whose  current  values  are  correlated  with past  and  current  errors,  but  not with future  errors.  Valid instruments  for
endogenous  variables  are  regressors  lagged  two  periods  or more.  In the  same  vein,  exogenous  variables  are  variables  which  are
uncorrelated  with any  past,  current  or future  errors,  and  these  variables  act  as  their  own  instruments.
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years is a very short epoch length, which means that growth rates may be more
reflective of business  cycles than of actual  underlying  long-term growth  rates. There is
therefore merit in changing the epoch length. But in the context of measuring the
effects of discrete shocks identified by dummy variables, there is clearly a limit to
how far the epoch length can be extended. As mentioned earlier, the original shock
variable is a year specific variable, but in the growth regression where the time
dimension is the epoch instead of the year, the shock variable must necessarily be
redefined to take the value of unity if a shock occurs within the epoch rather than
within a particular  year. It follows that as the epoch length is expanded,  the likelihood
of encountering  a shock increases.  Hence, in the extreme cases of an infinite number
of observations,  there will be no time variation  in the shock variable at all. While we
should therefore not estimate the model on growth rates calculated over the full
sample period, shocks are arguably sufficiently  rare to enable an enlargement of the
epoch length from four to eight years. In this framework,  the shock variable is the
redefined to take the value of unitv if a shock occurs within an eight-year  epoch rather
than the default four-year perioc.. Regression 3 reports the results of running the
regression on eight year rather than four year epochs. The shock coefficient is large,
negative and highly significant.  This is strong evidence  that the effect of shocks on
growth is not purely a cyclical eff;>ct.
An interesting  question is obviously how negative shocks manage to depress
growth rates. A possible route is via investment, which is  known to  be  robust
determinant of growth (Levine and Renelt (1990)). So far we have assumed that
investment is fully determined ty  policies, which allows us to simply estimate the
reduced form empirical  growth eqjuation.  The validity of this approach  is supported  by
regression 1 in Table 10, which is simply  the canonical regression  to which we have
added the ratio of private investrment  to GDP as a regressor. The investment data are
from Serven (1998). Due to the obvious endogeneity of investment rates and the
possible endogeneity  of policy, we have estimated the investment augmented  growth
equations in Table  10 using SYS-GMM. Regression I  shows that investment is
insignificant  when the growth equation includes the policy variable. In regression 2,
the policy variable is dropped,  and the investment  equation is now significant  at the
10% level. This is not a major improvement  over regression 1, but it does suggest  that
33policy has  some influence over investment as  has been supposed so  far. More
importantly, negative shocks remain highly significant  regardless of whether or not
policy and/or investment  are included in the regression. This suggests that the main
route whereby negative shocks affect growth is neither via a worsening of the policy
environment nor via a dramatic reduction in investment. The remaining avenue of
adjustment is via 'efficiency"'. In this view, output is adjusted  downwards in the face
of shocks through a reduction  in the utilization  of existing  capacity.
Finally, in regressions 3 and 4, we examine if the relationship  between policy
and aid established by Burnside and Dollar (1997) is robust to the inclusion of the
negative shock tenn. Burnside and Dollar show that aid has a positive impact on
growth in developing  countries  with good fiscal, monetary, and trade policies, but has
little effect in the presence of poor policies. In regression  3, we estimate  the preferred
model using the full sample of 275 observations,  and we find that aid interacted with
policy and  aid squared interacted with policy are both  significant as found by
Burnside and Dollar. The significance  of the interaction term is, however, attributed
by the authors to 5 outliers, wherefore we also ran the negative shock augmented
growth model without these five outliers. The result reported in regression 4  is
identical to what Burnside and Dollar find, namely that the aid policy variable is still
significant,  while the interaction  term is now no longer significant.  Hence, Bumside
and Dollar's results are not reversed by the inclusion of negative shocks into their
growth  model.
This  paper aims to  evaluate the  effects on  growth of  commodity price
uncertainty as  well as  commodity price shocks, and  the  preferred specification
reported  so far  is  notable for  the  absence of  uncertainty variables among the
regressors.  This is simply  because uncertainty  was never found to be significant  in the
growth equation regression. To  illustrate this, in  Table 11 we  report 4  growth
regressions, which include different measures of commodity price uncertainty. In
regression 1, we measure uncertainty  using epoch  averages of the conditional  variance
of commodity prices correcting for the oil shock in the early 1970s. This measure,
which was the best performing  arnong the competing  specifications,  is insignificant.
Similar measures,  which variously  did and did not 'dummy' out the effects of various
shocks produced  similar effects. In regression 2, we replace the GARCH measure by
Ignoring  technical  progress.
34a simple standard deviation of commodity prices variable, which can be thought of as
a measure of commodity price variability rather than uncertainty. This variable is also
insignificant.  Finally,  in  regressions  3  and  4  we  estimate  uncertainty  augmented
growth equations on different sub-samples of the data by splitting the sample into pre-
1982 and post-1981 samples, respectively. This is done in order to evaluate if pooling
across the highly unstable  1970s and periods of less instability is the reason for the
insignificance  of the uncertainty tlerm. In both  regressions, however, uncertainty  is
consistently  insignificant  as  a  determinant  of  growth,  while  the  negative  shock
variable in all cases remains highly significant. In total, we experimented with nine
different  uncertainty  measures",  with  and without the  negative  shock variable, but
none of these experiments produced robust and significant coefficients in the growth
equation.
10. Conclusion
The key contributions to the empirical temporary trade  shocks literature have
been  made by  Deaton  and Miller (1995) who  estimate  a VAR extended to  include
commodity prices  in levels,  and  Collier and  Gunning  (1999a) who  regress  annual
growth rates of GDP on investment, positive shocks, and various lags and interaction
terms within a pooled  OLS model. Deaton and Miller (1995) find that  international
commodity prices strongly affect :)utput, mostly via investment. Collier and Gunning
(1999a) likewise find that output initially responds very strongly to shocks, but they
reach the conclusion that the long run overall effect of shocks on growth is negative.
They  argue here  and  elsewhere  (Collier and  Gunning  (1996))  that  adverse  policy
decisions are to blame.
Our approach has been to estimate the effects on growth of commodity price
shocks  and  uncertainty within arn established empirical growth model. This  confers
certain  advantages  in  that  our  iesults  are more  easily  compared  to  other  growth
models, including the influential model of Burnside and Dollar (1997). We have thus
been able to show that the interaction between policy and aid is robust to the inclusion
of variables capturing commodity price movements. More importantly, however, our
approach has made three importent methodological departures from the contributions
The six measures  described  in Table I plus corditional standard deviation  versions  of each of the GARCH  measures.
35by  Deaton  and  Miller  (1995)  and  Collier  and  Gunning  (1999a).  Firstly,  we  have
attempted to deal with issues of endogeneity without  incurring an excessive loss of
efficiency. Our methodology therefore strikes a balance between these two papers by
correcting  for  the  potential  bias  in  the  Collier-Gunning  paper  by  employing  a
methodology,  which  takes  explicit  account  of  endogeneity  issues,  while  also
maximizing efficiency by not estimating fully unrestricted equations.
Secondly,  we  have  defined  our  dependent  variable  to  better  enable  an
assessment  of the longer-term implications of temporary trade  shocks. While we do
not claim to be able to discriminate between cyclical and long run growth rate effects,
the present  analysis does go  further towards this  goal by  using four and eight  year
epoch growth rates as the dependent variable, since epoch averages are more likely to
erase purely cyclical effects.
Thirdly, we have not imposed any priors on how commodity price movements
affect growth. Instead, we have compared and contrasted a range of competing shock
and  uncertainty  specifications, which  include but are not confined  to the  variables
used in other contributions. Thus, we both allow for the possibility of non-linearity  in
the  effect of commodity prices on growth,  and for asymmetrical effects of positive
and negative shocks on growth. By testing for the best performing among competing
specifications, we have arguably been able to obtain more efficient and  less biased
estimates of the effects of shocks.
A  key contribution of this paper is to offer a resolution to the disagreement
over the long run effect of positive shocks  on growth.  We find that positive  shocks
have  no  long run impact on  growth. This result confirms that windfalls  from trade
shocks do  not translate into sustainable increases in income as suggested by  Collier
and Gunning (1999a). The result is also supportive of Deaton and Miller (1995) who
find  evidence  of positive  effect  on  income  in  the  short  run,  but  no  evidence  of
negative  effects. The result, however, overturns the finding of Collier and Gunning
that the long run effect of positive shocks in negative.
Why might positive commodity shocks not translate systematically into higher
growth rates? Collier and Gunning (1996) attribute this to five key policy errors on the
part  of governments.  First,  they  sometimes  fail to  save windfalls.  Secondly,  even
when they save early on they then fail to lock into the savings decision, proceeding to
spend  the  windfall  rapidly.  Thirdly,  windfall  spending  typically  results  in  large
36expenditures on capital projects undertaken  while the boom is still in progress. Since
domestic prices are high at such timnes,  the efficiency  of public investment  projects is
reduced. Fourthly, windfall is often channeled into low return projects for political
rather than economic  reasons. Finally, governments  often end up with widened  fiscal
deficits after the end of the shock iSchuknecht (1996)), which must be financed by
extracting  taxes from the private sector  after the boom ends.
The second key contribution  is to show that negative  shocks  have large, highly
significant and  negative effects cn  growth as  suggested by  Rodrik (1998). An
interesting difference from Rodrik's work is  that Rodrik's  shock variable loses
significance  when indicators of latent social conflict are introduced. In contrast, our
negative shock variable remains highly significant at  the  introduction of  such
indicators (institutional quality, etlmolinguistic  fractionalization  and assassinations).
The implication of this  is clear: With greater attention paid to  how shocks are
modeled, it can be shown that negative  shocks  precipitate  growth collapses regardless
of whether a country is socially divided or has weak institutions.  Hence, institutions
may not matter as much as RodrLk's  results suggest. Indeed, the insignificance of
Rodrik's shock variable may have more to do with not distinguishing  between large
and  small shocks than  with  the inclusion of  social conflict variables into his
regression.
The negative shock effect is also robust to the inclusion of investment in the
growth regression. This indicates that  economies adjust to  negative shocks by
lowering capacity utilization rather than by  disinvesting. This  interpretation is
consistent with the observation  that investment  decisions  in developing countries are
irreversible  (Collier and Gunning  (1  999b)).
By  modeling  shocks  and  uncertainty simultaneously, it  is  possible  to
determine  whether growth  is affected  by ex post shocks, ex ante uncertainty,  or indeed
by both these manifestations  of commodity  price movements.  To the extent that both
matter, of course, this approach  al so  avoids omitted  variable  bias. The third key result,
however, is that commodity price uncertainty does not affect growth. This finding
holds for  various different specifications of  the uncertainty variable and across
different  sample  periods.  Commodity  price  uncertainty  remains  insignificant
regardless of  whether we  include or exclude ex  post  shocks in  the  regression
37specification.  This is a surprising  result, because  uncertainty  is often  put forward  as an
important  determinant  of investment,  and therefore  growth.
Our results are highly robust. In particular, we have showed that negative
shocks affect growth across different samples of countries, across different growth
epochs, and across different  lengths  of growth  epochs. The results also hold when we
consider  different specifications  of the growth  model, and when we include additional
regressors,  such as aid and uncertainty.  Our preferred  model is robust to the inclusion
of country  and time dummies  and to estimation  using TSLS and SYS-GMM  methods,
which take full account  of endogeneity.
38Table 1: Uncertainty and Variatility  Measures
No.  Nature of  Description  Predictable  Shocks  'dummied
uncertainty  element in  out'of  residuals
variable  process  and conditional
variance
i  Tine varying  Garch conditional  standard  deviation  of one  LDV,  T, TA2,  QD
uncertainty  step ahead forecast  errc  r
11  Time  varying  Garch  conditional  stand,ard  deviation  of one  LDV, T, TA2,  QD  First  oil shock only
uncertainty  step ahead forecast  errc  r dymmying  out first  (1973Q3-1974Q2)
oil shock
IlIl  Time varying  Garch conditional  stand  3rd  deviation  of one  LDV,  T, TA2,  QD  All 2.5% positive  and
uncertainty  step ahead  forecast  errcr dummying  out all  negative  shocks
shocks
IV  Time invariant  Ramey & Ramey unconditional  standard  LDV,  T, TA2,  QD
uncertainty  deviation
V  Time invariant  Ramey & Ramey unconditional  standard  LDV,  T,  QD  Trend  break and
uncertainty  deviation  intercept  break  in
1973Q3
VI  Time invariant  Simple  unconditional  standard  deviation
variability
(Note: WDV', 'T  TA2',  and 'QD' denote  laggeci  dependent  variable,  linear  time trend, trend  squared,  and quarterly  dummies)
39Table 2: Commodity Price Uncertainty, By Region
Reon  (Group  numbw)  pod  n  I  II  I  V  v  VI
A#113counhtis  1957-1997  113  0.08  (003)  0.07  (002)  0.06  (o02)  0.08  (o03)  0.08  (o03)  0.30  (013)
Sulb-ShManAfica  1957-1997  44  0.08  (oo3)  0.07  (o.o2)  0.06  (o02)  0.08  (003)  0.08  (o02)  0.27  (01f)
MkEid Cut  and NorthAftta  1957-1997  16  0.12  (oo4)  0.08  (002)  0.06  (001)  0.11  (004)  0.11  (o03)  0.45  (o i)
L.in  Amfka  1957-1997  17  0.07  (002)  0.07  (o02)  0.06  (foo)  0.07  (002)  0.07  (.0o2)  0.27  (009g)
SouthAsi.  1957-1997  5  0.07  (0.02)  0.07  (002)  0.07  (003)  0.07  (oo2)  0.07  (coo2)  0.35  (ois)
East Asia  1957-1997  11  0.08  (o03)  0.07  (003)  0.07  (o03)  0.08  (0a3)  0.08  (o03)  0.26  (oo0)
fic  1957-1997  5  0.07  (o0)  0.07  (002)  0.07  (o02)  0.07  (o02)  0.07  (002)  0.29  (o01)
COanbban  1957-1997  14  0.08  (004)  0.08  (o03)  0.07  (0o0)  0.09  (003)  0.08  (o03)  0.25  (014)
SouOhAbtca  1957-1997  1  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.15
ALL  1957-1972  113  0.07  (004)  0.05  (002)  0.05  (002)  0.05  (002)  0.05  (002)  0.10  (005)
4LL  1973-1995  113  0.09  (O03)  0.08  (002)  0.07  (o00)  0.10  (004)  0.10  (004)  0.24  (o01)
AL..  1986-1997  113  0.09  (004)  0.09  (004)  0.08  (o03)  0.09  (o00)  0.09  (o04)  0.15  (007)
Sub-SahahanAfnca  1957-1972  44  0.06  (003)  0.05  (o02)  0.05  (002)  0.05  (002)  0.05  (002)  0.11  (00)
Sub-SaharanAfnca  1973-1985  44  0.09  (003)  0.08  (O02)  0.07  (o02)  0.10  (004)  0.09  (o03)  0.22  (o00)
Sub-SaharanAfria  1986-1997  44  0.08  (003)  0.08  (0,0)  0.07  (o03)  0.08  (003)  0.08  (003)  0.16  (o09)
M  East and NorthAftne  1957-1972  16  0.12  (004)  0.05  (0o02  0.04  (00o)  0.04  (o01)  0.03  (o00)  0.06  (002)
94A/d  East and North Aft/ca  1973-1995  16  0.13  (0o4)  0.09  (003)  0.05  (001)  0.16  (oo5)  0.15  (0o5)  0.37  (o12)
Mtdde Est  and North Aftca  1986-1997  16  0.12  (004)  0.12  (o00)  0.09  (o03)  0.12  (oo4)  0.11  (o04)  0.13  (0V2)
Lfain Anwma  1957-1972  17  0.06  (003)  0.05  (002)  0.05  (o02)  0.04  (002)  0.04  (o02)  0.09  (o09)
Latin  Amnanca  1973-1985  17  0.0  (00o2)  0.07  (0  02)  0.06  (001i)  0.D9  (00o3)  0.08  (00o3) 0.20  (009p)
LaIn Amnca  1986-1997  17  0.08  (003)  0.08  (o03)  0.07  (0o0  0.08  (o03)  0.08  (o03)  0.13  (005)
South Asia  1957-1972  5  0.06  (003)  0.06  (o03)  0.06  (o03)  0.06  (003)  0.06  (o03)  0.12  (oo0)
Sou/hAsie  1973-1985  5  0.08  (002)  0.08  (oa2)  0.08  (o00)  0.08  (002)  0.08  (o03)  0.27  (o01)
SouthAsa  0  1986-1997  5  0.08  (0o2)  0.07  (o03)  0.08  (oa3)  0.07  (002)  0.07  (oa2)  0.15  (007)
Esst Asia  1957-1972  11  0.06  (002)  0.06  (O02)  0.06  (002)  0.05  (002)  0.05  (002)  0.13  (007)
East Aab  1973-1985  11  0.08  (0o3)  0.07  (003)  0.07  (003)  0.09  (003)  0.08  (oo3)  0.21  (007)
East Asfa  1986-1997  11  0.09  (005)  0.09  (005)  0.08  (o00)  0.09  (000)  0.09  (o00)  0.15  (o  10)
PcfDcM  1957-1972  5  0.06  (O02)  0.06  (o02)  0.06  (o02)  0.05  (o0o)  0.05  (00t)  0.12  (0.05)
Pacifc  1973-1985  5  0.08  (002)  0.08  (002)  0.08  ()02)  0.09  (002)  0.09  (o00)  0.24  (00o)
Pacfi7c  1986-1997  5  0.07  (003)  0.07  (003)  0.07  (o03)  0.07  (003)  0.07  (003)  0.15  (0O0)
Canbbean  1957-1972  14  0.06  (o04)  0.05  (003)  0.05  (003)  0.05  (003)  0.05  (003)  0.11  (006)
Cainbben  1973-1985  14  0.09  (o0o)  0.08  (o02)  0.07  (002)  0.10  (0o4)  0.10  (oo4)  0.20  (011)
Caribbean  1986-1997  14  0.10  (005)  0.10  (oo5)  0.09  (004)  0.10  (OO5)  0.10  (004)  0.16  (007)
Sou/hA.9lca  1957-1972  1  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03
SouLdAfFka  1973-1985  1  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.08
South Afca  1986-1997  1  0.03  0.03  0 .03  0.03  0.03  0.07
(Note: Figures  in BOLD  are averages,  while smallerfigures  in italic are standard  deviations  across group  members)
Key:
I-Average  conditional  standard  deviation  (GARCH base case)
TI-Average  conditional  standard  deviation  (GARCH  controlling  for 1973/74  shock)
III-Average  conditional  standard  deviation  (GARCH  controlling  for all shocks)
IV-Unconditional  standard  deviation  (Ramey  and Ramey)
V-Unconditional  standard  deviation  (Ramey and Ramey  w. 1973Q3  break)
VI-Simple  unconditional  standard  deviation
40Table 3: Commodity Price Uncertainty, By Commodity Type
Commodity  type  rime  period  n  I  tl  111  IV  V  VI
Al  113 countries  1957-1997  113  0.08  (0.3)  0.07  (002)  0.06  (002)  0.08  (003)  0.08  (o03)  0.30  (0.13)
Agricultural food  stuffs  1957-1997  52  0.07  (oo2)  0.07  (0.02)  0.07  (0o2)  0.08  (0.2)  0.08  (0.2)  0.25  (ote)
Agriculturalnon-foods  1957-1997  18  0.06  (0.)2)  0.06  (0.02)  0.06  (o02)  0.07  (0o.2)  0.07  (002)  0.24  (0oo)
Non-agro non-oil  1957-1997  17  0.07  (0.,2)  0.06  (0.02)  0.06  (o02)  0.07  (o2)  0.07  (a02)  0.23  (0o.)
Oil  1957-1997  23  0.13  (0.33)  0.09  (0.02)  0.06  (0o.)  0.12  (002)  0.12  (002)  0.60  (.o)
Mixed  1957-1997  3  0.06  (e.  n)  0.05  (0.o0)  0.05  (o0o)  0.06  (o o1)  0.06  (o01)  0.24  (o  03)
Agricultural food stuffs  1957-1972  52  0.06  (0.22)  0.06  (0o2)  0.06  (o.o2)  0.05  (0a2)  0.06  (0o2)  0.11  (005)
Agricultural food  stuffs  1973-19f5  52  0.08  (0o.2)  0.08  (0.02)  0.07  (0o2)  0.09  (0.2)  0.09  (0o2)  0.20  (oo0)
Agriculturat food  stuffs  1986-1997  52  0.08  (0o.4)  0.08  (0o4)  0.08  (004)  0.08  (0.04)  0.08  (004)  0.17  (0.08)
Agriculturalnon-foods  1957-1972  18  0.05  (002)  0.05  (0o2)  0.06  (0o2)  0.04  (002)  0.04  (0o2)  0.09  (0.05)
Agricultural non-foods  1973-1985  18  0.07  (002)  0.07  (0.2)  0.07  (0o.2)  0.08  (0.02)  0.07  (o.2)  0.19  (0.08)
Agriculturae  non-foods  1986-1997  18  0.08  (C  02)  0.08  (0.02)  0.07  (0o2)  0.08  (0o2)  0.08  (002)  0.16  (oos)
Non-agro non-oil  1957-1972  17  0.06  (1.03)  0.05  (0o3)  0.05  (0o3)  0.05  (0o3)  0.05  (o.03)  0.15  (o08)
Non-agro non-oil  1973-1985  17  0.07  (1.02)  0.07  (0.02)  0.07  (0.2  0.08  (0o3)  0.08  (0o3)  0.20  (0.o
Non-agro non-oil  1986-1997  17  0.07  (1102)  0.07  (0.02)  0.06  (002)  0.07  (0o2)  0.07  (0o2)  0.14  (009)
oil  1957-1972  23  0.12  (11.0)  0.06  (002)  0.04  (000o)  0.04  (0.00)  0.03  (o000) 0.06  (0.00)
Oil  1973-1985  23  0.14  ().30)  0.09  (002)  0.06  (0o0)  0.17  (003)  0.17  (003)  0.40  (0.09)
Oil  1986-1997  23  0.14  (.02)  0.13  (0.4)  0.10  (o02)  0.13  (o02)  0.13  (0o.)  0.12  (o02)
Mixed  1957-1972  3  0.05  (2.01)  0.04  (0.03)  0.04  (0oo)  0.04  (0o1)  0.04  (0o0)  0.09  (ao3)
Mixed  1973-1985  3  0.06  (oo0)  0.05  (0o.)  0.06  (o0))  0.07  (0o.)  0.07  (0.03)  0.16  (0.031
Mixed  1986-1997  3  0.05  6  o  00)  0.06  (0o01) 0.04  (0oo0) 0.05  (0.o0)  0.06  (too0)  0.11  (o04)
(Note.  Figures  in BOLD  are  averages,  while  smalerfigures  in italic  are standard  deviations  across  group  members)
Key:
I-Average  conditional  standard  deviation  (GARCH  base case)
lI-Average conditional  standard  deviation  (GARCH  controlling  for 1973/74  shock)
III-Average  conditional  standard  (leviation  (GARCH  controlling  for all shocks)
IV-Unconditional  standard  deviation  (Ramey  and Ramey)
V-Unconditional  standard  deviati n (Ramey and Ramey w. 1973Q3  break)
VI-Simple  unconditional  standarcl  deviation
41Table 4
Growth regression results
Dependent  variable:  Growth  of real  per capita  GDP
White  heteroskedasticRty  consistent  standard  errors  in (liacs)
(",  ',  ~and  denote  significance  at 1%, 5%,  and  10%  respectively)
No.  1  2  3  4
Pooled  OLS
with 1st  Pooled  OLS
Pooled OLS  Pooled OLS  difference  of  with positive
Canonkal  with commodity  commodity  and negative
Model  model  prices  in levels  prices  shock  dummies
initial Income  (inlY)  -0.65  -0.67  -0.70  -0.58
(0.53)  (052)  (0.52)  (0.53)
Ethnollnguistic  fractlonallsatlon  (ethnt)  -0.58  -0.60  -0.58  -0.59
(0.74)  (0,73)  (0 74)  (0.74)
Assassinations  (ASSAS)  -0.44  -0.42  -0.40  -0.41
(o 27)  (0.27)  (0-27)  (0.27)
Ethnollnguistic  fractlonallsatlon  x Assasinations  (ethnas)  0.81  *  0.78  *  0.74  0.73
(0.45)  (0.45)  (0.45)  (0.46)
Institutional  quality  (ICRGE)  0.64  *  0.64  ^  0.65  '  0.59  *
(0.1s)  (0.18)  (0.17)  (0.16)
M21GDP  (M21)  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01
(001)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)
Sub-SaharanAfrlcadummy(SSA)  -1.53  -1.51  -1.58  **  -1.47  **
(0.73)  (0.72)  (0.71)  (0 74)
EastAsian  dummy  (EASIA)  0.89  0.90  0.90  0.78
(0.55)  (005)  (0-55)  (0.54)
Policy  (policy)  1.00  (  1.00  '*  0.97  1.03
(0.15)  (0.14)  (015)  (o15)
Log(Commodity  prices)  (Idmav)  -0.56
(0,60)
lst Difference  of  Log(Commodity  prices)  (didmav)  13.03
(10o66)
Large  positive  shock  dummy  (pos)  0.55
(o 51)
Large  negative  shock  dummy  (neg)  -1.04
(0.49)
Epoch  dummy  (ed3)  -0.01  0.13  -0.02  -0.07
(0.59)  (060)  (o  59)  (0  60)
Epoch dummy  (ed4)  -1.35  -1.19  -1.24  -1.32
(085)  (0.62)  (0.67)  (0.65)
Epoch dummy  (ed6)  ,3.37  -3.23  -3.20  -3.26
(059)  (059)  (0.63)  (0.60)
Epoch dummy (e*d)  -1.96  -1.96  -1.71  -1.37
(0.53)  (0.53)  (o  56)  (056)
Epoch dummy (od?)  -2.31  -2.39  ..  -2.07  -2.04
(0-62)  (0o63)  (o  66)  (0 64)
Constant  3.76  3.94  4.07  3.30
(3.80)  (3.75)  (3.72)  (3.82)
No. countries  56  56  56  56
No. observations  275  275  275  275
F(regresslon)  18.29  17.27  17.49  16.24
R squared  0.39  0.39  0.40  0.40
42Table  5
Growth  regression  results
Dependent  varables  Growth  of real  per capita  GOP
Wnit  heteroskedastcity  consistent  standard  errors  in (0.,.)
(  ,  , and  denote significance  at  1%, 5%, and 10% respectwely)
No.  1  2  3  4  5
Pooled  OLS
Pooled OLS w.  with negative
Pooled OLS w.  positive,  smati  Regression 2  price changes,
positive and  negative  prke  with level  negative shock  Pooled OLS
negative  price  changes,and  interaction  dummy, and  preferred
Model  changes  shocks  terms  interaction tenm  specIircation
Initlal Income  liniY)  -0.63  -0.41  -0.38  -0.42  -0.44
(050)  (052)  (052)  (054)  (0.54
Ethnolinrgultic  tractionallsatlon (ethnf)  -0.51  -0.28  -0.31  -0.27  -0.30
(0.74)  (0.73)  (0.74)  (0 74)  (0.73)
Asassinatlons  (ASSAS)  -0.37  -0.38  -0.39  -0.38  -0.37
(0.27)  (0.27)  (027)  (027)  (0.27)
Ethnolinguistic iractlonalisatlon x Assasinations (ethnaa)  0.69  0.62  0.63  0.62  0.62
(0.44)  (0.47)  (0.47)  (0 47)  (0.47)
Institutional  quality  (ICRGE)  0.64  0.59  0.58  0.59  0.59
(0.17)  (0.17)  (017)  (0.1')  (0.1  )
M2IGDP  (Mz2)  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02
(0  .1)  (0  01)  (0  01)  (001)  (0.01)
Sub.aharan  Afrca dummy  (SSA)  -1.54  -1.42  -1.42  -1.42  -1.44
(0  71)  (0.70)  (0.  70)  (0  72)  (0.72)
East  Asian  dummy (EASIA)  0.84  0.77  0.78  0.80  0.78
(0  50)  (0.55)  (o  00)  (0.0)  (004)
Policy(policy)  0.98  1.02  1.02  1.02  1.02
(o  15)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (015)
Negative  commodity price changes jdldmN)  -30.44  2.72  -3.58  6.39
114.34)  (17.62)  (24.94)  (17  00)
Positive commodity price  changes (didmP)  -4.99  -3.51  -3.38
(22.95)  (22  74)  (22.60)
Neg.  shockicom. price change Interacton (negdidmN)  -65.90  -72.15  -76.17  -62.46
(21  40)  (2950)  (3070)  (1705)
Neg.  price changellevel Interaction (negDNldm)  19 35
(f5.96)
Shock/Neg.  price  changentevel  Interaction (negDNtdm)  55.75
(6 57)
Negative  shock dummy (nag)  0.33
(069)
Epoch dummy (ed3)  0.30  0.27  0.24  0.20  0.24
(  59)  (o  58)  (o  59)  (0.61)  (o  59)
Epoch dummy (ed4)  -1.19  -1.30  -1.38  -1.32  -1 28
(0.66)  (0.66)  (0.67)  (O  67)  (0.66)
Epoch dummy (edS)  -3.26  -3.43  -3.43  -3.43  -3.39
(063)  (0  63)  (063)  (0e60)  (0.09)
Epochdummy(ed6)  -1.60  -1.42  -1.31  -1.51  -1.40
(0  54)  (0e53)  (O  54)  (056)  (0  5)
Epoch dummy (ed7)  -2.09  -2.39  -2.30  -2.43  -2.33
(0.66)  (0  66)  ()072)  (0.69)  (0.61)
Constant  3.70  2.08  1.86  2.02  2.24
(3 64  (3.74  (3  75)  (3  69)  (3085)
No. countries  56  56  56  56  56
No. observatlons  275  275  275  275  275
F(regresslon)  16.64  16.26  t14.3  1552  17  82
R squared  0.40  0.41  0.42  0.41  0.41
43Table 6
Growth elasticities  of negative  shocks
Coeffcient  and  _  _ 
Mean  of  variables  standard  deviation  Elasticity  evaluated  at:
Negative
changes in
commodity  Sigma  Mean  - Mean  +  Mean  +
Obs  Growth  prices  Beta  (Seta)  Mean  I'sigma  I sigma  2sigme
Shock  changes  31  1.173  0.025  -62.463  0.014  -1.345  -0.580  -2.111  -2.876
Allchanges  171  1.173  0.014  -62.463  0.012  -0.763  -0.134  -1.393  -2.022
Non-shock  changes  140  1.173  0.012  -62.463  0.010  -0.634  -0.119  -1.150  -1.665
44Table  7
Growth regression results
Dependent variable:  Growth of real per capita GDP
White heteroskedasticity  consistent standard errors  in (iics).
('-',  '',  and ''  denote significance  at 1%, 5%, and 10°k respectively)
No.  1  2  3  4
Pooled  OLS
Pooled  OLS  preferred
preferred  Pooled  OLS  specification
specification  preferred  (omitting  oil  Pooled  OLS
(omitting  5  specification  producers  and  preferred
Bumside  Dollar  (omitting  oil  middle  income  specification
Model  outliers)  producers)  countries)  (SSA only)
Initial  Income  (iniY)  -0.46  -0.58  -0.31  0.50
(054)  (048)  (O87)  (1.40)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation (ethnf)  -0.30  -0.52  -0.97  2.11
(0.74)  (0.76)  (0.91)  (1.96)
Assassinations (ASSAS)  -0.37  -0.44  -0.76  9.86
(O  27)  (0.29)  (O  52)  (7.59)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation x Assasinations (e,:hnas)  0.62  0.82 *  1.19  -16.34
(0.47)  (0 48)  (O  93)  (12283)
Institutional quality (ICRGE)  0.62  0.84  0.96  0.62
(0.16)  (0.17)  (0.21)  (0.43)
M21GDP  (M21)  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.04
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.05)
Sub-Saharan  Africa dummy (SSA)  -1.40  -2.01  -2.04 *
(0 73)  (0.40)  (0.71)
East Asian  dummy (EASIA)  0.74  0.03  -0.18
(0 56)  (O  59)  (O  71)
Policy (policy)  1.03  **  1.06  1.12  1.06
(O  16)  (O  15)  (0.21)  (043)
Neg.  shocklcom. price change  interacton (negdldniN)  -65.75  -53.04  -40.72  -64.44
(1716)  (17 31)  (24  40)  (42.37)
Epoch dummy (ed3)  0.27  0.15  0.46  -0.27
(O  59)  (O  55)  (O  67)  (1 55)
Epoch dummy (ed4)  -1.26  -0.70  -0.54  -2.36
(0.65)  (0.64)  (0.81)  (1.69)
Epoch  dummy (ed5)  -3.36  -3.00  -2.26  -4.07
(0.59)  (0.62)  (0.79)  (1.30)
Epoch  dummy (ed6)  -1.20  -1.05  -1.00  -1.95
(O  52)  (0.52)  (O  65)  (1.28)
Epoch  dummy (ed7)  -2.28  -2.40  -2.70  -4.49
(0.63)  (0.92)  (0.79)  (1.45)
Constant  2.34  2.03  -0.58  -7.25
(3.89)  (351)  (619)  (9.32)
No. countrles  56  47  35  21
No. observations  275  230  166  84
F(regression)  16.76  16.41  12.43  2.78
R squared  0.41  0.47  0.48  0.26
45Table 8
Growth regression results
Dependent variable: Growth of real per capita GDP
Wvihte heteroskedasticity  consistent  standard errors in (italics)
('-"  '-,and  "denote  significance at 1%, 5%, and  10% respectively)
No.  1  2  3  4
Pooled  OLS  Pooled  OLS  w.
preferred  positive,  small
specification  negative  price  TSLS  SYS-GMM
(Random  effects  changes,  and  (instrumenting  (instrumenting
Model  model)  shocks  for  policy)  forpolicy)
Initial income  (InlY)  -0.45  -2.36  **  -0.44  -3.99  *
(0r37)  (I 04)  (054)  (1.50)
Ethnolingulstic  fractionalisation  (ethnt)  -0.30  -0.30  -2.33
(0.81)  (0.  73)  (1.50)
Assassinations  (ASSAS)  -0.38  -0.61  -0.37  -0.40
(0e30)  (0e38)  (0.28)  (0.28)
EthnollnguistlcfractionalisationxAssasinations(ethnas)  0.63  1.10  0.63  0.80
(0.62)  (0-78)  (0.47)  (0.44)
Institutional  quality  (ICRGE)  0.60  *  0.59  1.32  ^
(0 18)  (018)  (0.49)
M2iGDP  (M21)  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01
(0.02)  (0 03)  (0.01)  (0.02)
Sub-Saharan  Africa dummy (SSA)  -1.45  "s  -1.43  -3.86
(0863)  (0 73)  (1. 68)
EastAsian dtmmy (EASIA)  0.78  0.73  1.14
(0.89)  (0.61)  (1.00)
Policy (policy)  1.01  0.85  1.05 *c  0.73
(017)  (021)  (0.22)  (0 32)
Neg.  shocklcom. price change interacton (negdidmN)  -62.26  -54.51  -62.59  -37.14
(2027)  (21.24)  (17 14)  (18.92)
Epoch  dummy (ed3)  0.24  0.44  0.25  0.52
(0.61)  (0 62)  (0.59)  (0 55)
Epoch  dummy (ed4)  -1.28  -1.01  -1.28  -0.77
(081)  (0.85)  (0.85)  (075)
Epoch  dummy (ed5)  -3.39  -3.12  -3.38  -3.08
(0.62)  (0.67)  (0.59)  (0.70)
Epoch dummy (ed6)  -1.40  **  -1.31  -1.40  -1.41
(0 86)  (0 72)  (0.52)  (0.63)
Epoch  dummy (ed7)  -2.34  -1.98  -2.36  -1.68  *
(a068)  (0.78)  (0 65)  (0a77)
Constant  2.29  19.01  **  2.21  27.45  *
(2.69)  (7 62)  (3.88)  (10.03)
No. countries  56  56  56  40
No. observations  275  275  275  194
F/Wald Chi2  178.39  16.26  15.53  113.03
R squared  (overall)  0.41  0.11  0.41
R squared  (within)  0.26  0.30
R squared  (between)  0.56  0.01
Hausman(RE  vs.FE)  5.71
F test  for  country  specific  effects  1.25
Hausman(FE  vs. OLS)  10.50
Hausman(TSLS  vs. OLS)  0.00
F test  for  time  dummies  31.75
Test for  1st order  serial  correlation  -2.41
Test for  2nd order  serial  correlation  1.16
Sargan  test  for  Instrument  optimality  39.59
First  and  greater
Instruments for policy  SACW-iniY  lags of OY
First and greater
SACW'iniY'2  lags of M21
Second  and
greater  lags  of
SACW-LPOP  policy
46Table  9
Growth regression  results
Dependent  variable:  Growth  of real per  capita  GDP
White  heteroskedasticity  consistent  standard  erro s in (ta/ics)
(  and  denote  significance  at 1%,  5%,  and 10%  respectively)
No.  1  2  3
Pooled OLS  Pooled OLS
preferred  preferred  Pooled OLS
specification  specification  with 8 year
Model  (1970-1981)  (1982-1993)  epochs
Initial income (iniY)  -0.46  -0.33  -0.10
(0.88)  (0  62)  (0  68)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation (ethnf)  -0.27  -0.20  -0.02
(1  11)  (1.  01)  (O  88)
Assassinations (ASSAS)  -0.88  0.10  -0.22
(0.59)  (0.22)  (0.30)
Ethnolinguisticfractlonalisation  xAssasinatlons (ethnas)  1.51  -0.09  0.15
(O  93)  (0 63)  (0  57)
Institutional quality (ICRGE)  0.69  0.50  **  0.47  **
(0.26)  (0.24)  (020)
M2/GDP  (M21)  0.00  0.02  0.02
(0.03)  (0.02)  (0.01)
Sub-Saharan  Africa dummy (SSA)  -1.66  -1.23  -1.10
(1 19)  (0 78)  (0.82)
East Asian dummy (EASIA)  0.06  1.69  0.65
(0 84)  (0.86)  (0.62)
Policy (policy)  0.93  **  1.00  1.12
(0.40)  (0 16)  (0.17)
Neg. shock/com. price change interacton (negdldmN)  -52.25  *  -82.30  -95.75
(22.  95)  (25 83)  (28 44)
Epoch dummy (ed3)  0.29
(0.60)
Epoch dummy (ed4)  -1.19  *
(0  67)
Epoch dummy (ed5)
Epoch  dummy (ed6)  2.15
(0  61)
Epoch  dummy (ed7)  0.90
(0.63)
Constant  2.55  -1.96  0.08
(6.26)  (4 54)  (4.68)
8 year  epoch dummy (v81)  -2.56  *
(o  05)
8 year epoch dummy (v82)  -1.93
(0.49)
No.  countries  50  52  56
No. observations  136  139  149
F  7.56  13.75  16.80
R squared (overall)  0.28  0.50  0.46
47Table  10
Growth  regression  results
Dependent  variable:  Growth  of real  per  capita  GDP
White  heteroskedasticity  consistent  standard  errors  in (itasics)
and  denote  significance  at 1%,  5%, and  10%  respectively)
No.  1  2  3  4
SYS-GMM  Pooled  OL.S  Pooled  OLS
preferred  with  aid and  with  aid and
SYS-GMM  specification  policy  policy
preferred  with Investment  interaction  interaction
specfrication  and  without  terms  (full  terms  (without
Model  with  investment  policy  sample)  outliers)
Initial income  (IniY)  -4.20  -4.32  -0.39  -0.44
(1.20)  ((.23)  (0.59)  (0.59)
Ethnolingulstic fractionallsation  (ethnf)  -2.15  -2.15  -0.18  -0.19
(155)  (1.71)  (0  75)  (0e74)
Assassinations (ASSAS)  -0.33  -0.27  -0.37  -0.37
(0.25)  (023)  (0.27)  (027)
EthnolingulstUc  tractionatlsatlon x Assasinations (ethnas)  0.71 ^  057  0.61  0.60
(0.39)  (0.38)  (0.48)  (0.49)
Institutionalquality  (ICRGE)  1.17  1.31  0.62  ..  0.64
(0.36)  (0.37)  (0.17)  (0.19)
M2VGOP  (M21)  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.01
(0.02)  (0.03)  (001)  (001)
Sub-Saharan  Africa dummy (SSA)  -3.63  -3.82  -1.67  ^^  -1.67
(1.20)  (124)  (0.77)  (0.79)
EastAsian  dummy (EASIA)  0.13  1.11  1.03  ^  1.13
(1.18)  (1.16)  (0.59)  (0.59)
Policy (policy)  0.66  0.84  ^^  0.77  ^
(0.29)  (0  20)  (0.20)
Neg. shocfitcom. price change  lnteracton (negdidmN)  -37.14  -36.09  -61.94  -62.10
(17.12)  (18.05)  (17.14)  (17.10)
tnvestmentVGDP  (IlY)  0.14  0.15
(009)  (009)
AidlGDP  (EDA)  0.03  -0.06
(0.13)  (0e19)
AidlGDP  x Policy (edapolA)  0.18  0.17  ^^
(0.10)  (007)
(AldtGDP)^2  x Policy (eda2polA)  -0.02
(096)  (0 70)  (0.01)
Epoch  dummy (ed3)  0.25  0.13  0.23  0.24
(0.53)  (0055)  (0 59)  (0e59)
Epoch dummy (ed4)  -0.93  -1.00  -1.32  *  -1.31  ^-
(0.69)  (6  67)  (0 66)  (0  66)
Epoch dummy (ed5)  -2.95  -3.24  -3.47  -3.45
(0.66)  (0.70)  (0,60)  (0 90)
Epochdummy(ed6)  -1.13  ^  -1.11  -1.46  ^^  -1.39
(0.64)  (074)  (0.53)  (0.02)
Epoch dummy (ed7)  -1.46  *  -0.92  -2.37  -2.27
(0.79)  (0.96)  (0.65)  (0.95)
Constant  28.04  28.98  1.68  2.21
(7.60)  (7.79)  (4.28)  (4.29)
No.  countries  40  40  56  56
No.  observations  234  234  275  270
R squared  0.42  0.42
Wald  Chi2tF  157.35  114.11  . 16.59  16.50
Wald  test for time dummies  29.32  35.56
Test  for 1st order serial correlation  -2.90  -2.71
Test for 2nd order serial correlatlon  1.02  0.65
Sargan  test for instrument  optimallty  40.84  40.79
First  and  First  and
greater  lags  greater  lags
Instruments  of iniY  of iniY
First  and  First  and
greater  lags  greater  lags
of M21  of M21
48Table  11
Growth  regression  results
Dependent  variable:  Growth  of real  per capita  GDP
White  heteroskedasticity  consistent  standard  errors  in  (iteIcs)
(, 
m ,and  denote  significance  at 1%, 5%,  and  10%  respectively)
No.  1  2  3  4
Pooled  OLS  Pooled OLS
Pooled OLS  Pooled OLS  preferred  preferred
preferred  preferred  speclflcation w.  specification w.
specification  w.  specification  w.  GARCH  GARCH
GARCH  commodity  uncertainty  uncertainty
Model  uncertainty  price variability  (1970-1981)  (1982-1993)
Initial Income  (iniY)  -0.48  -0.45  -0.46  -0.46
(0r55)  (0 53)  (0.88)  (0865)
Ethnollngulstic fractionalsation (ethnf)  -0.31  -0.33  -0.27  -0.26
(0.73)  (0.74)  (1.11)  (1.02)
Assassinations  (ASSAS)  -0.37  -0.36  -0.88  0.10
(0.28)  (0r28)  (0 59)  (0.23)
Ethnolingulsct fractionalisataon  x Assasinations (eti nas)  0.62  0.60  1.51  -0.06
(0.47)  (0.47)  (0.93)  (0.63)
Institutional quality (ICRGE)  0.61 ...  0.58 ...  0.69 ...  0.55 *
(018)  (018)  (0.26)  (0.24)
M2/GDP  (M21)  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.02
(0.01)  (0.01)  (003)  (002)
Sub-Saharan  Africa dummy (SSA)  -1.48 ^  -1.39 *  -1.67  -1.41 *
(0.74)  (0.72)  (1.20)  (0 78)
East Asian  dummy (EASIA)  0.82  0.76  0.06  1.76 *
(0.54)  (0  54)  (0.64)  (0.86)
Policy (policy)  1.01  - 1.02  0.93  0.99
(0.15)  (0.14)  (040)  (018)
Neg. shocidcom. price change  interacton (negdldmNtI)  -65.03  -60.46  -52.30 **  -94.00
(16S5)  (17.34)  (2299)  (24.40)
GARCH  conditlonal variance (gar7O)  11  .34  0.72  28.62
(19.39)  (27.04)  (25.35)
Commodity price variability (std)  -2.70
(3.55)
Epoch  dummy (ed3)  0.20  0.43  0.28
(0.61)  (0.67)  (0.63)
Epoch  dummy (ed4)  -1.33  -1.18 *  -1.19 *
(0.66)  (0.84)  (0.68)
Epoch  dummy (edS)  -3.40  -3.40
(0.59)  (0.59)
Epoch  dummy  (ed6)  -1.44  -1.33 **  2.12 '*
(0.53)  (0.53)  (0.62)
Epoch  dummy (ad?)  -2.39  -2.33  0.80
(0.62)  (0.61)  (0.64)
constant  2.45  2.63  2.55  -1.19
(392)  (3.89)  (6.30)  (4.76)
No. countriea  56  56  50  52
No.  obServations  275  275  136  139
F(regression)  17.27  16.51  6,93  14.05
R squared  0.41  0.41  0.28  0.50
49Appendix: Data Sources and Coverage
Shocks  were identified  using an annual index, while uncertainty  was estimated
using quarterly indices. Both indices have identical composition,  use similar weights,
and therefore differ only in terms of their frequency. It was necessary to use high
frequency quarterly data to  obtain convergence for the GARCH models used to
estimate uncertainty, while discrete shocks are arguably better thought of as annual
events.
The indices are have constant 1990 base year weights, wherefore  they do not
cope well with shifts in the structure of trade. In particular,  the indices do not capture
resource discoveries and other quantity shocks after the base period. Nor do they
capture temporary volume shocks  except for those, which occur in the base year itself.
However, since the purpose is to capture price rather than quantity movements, it is
desirable to hold volumes constant. This also avoids possible endogeneity  problems
arising in the event of a volume response to price changes.  Nevertheless,  indices will
understate income effects of a given price change. The data set covers 113 countries
of which 44 are Sub-Saharan African countries, 16 are from the Middle East and
North Africa, 19 are from Latin America,  7 are from South Asia, 9 are from East Asia,
5 from the Pacific, and 12 are from the Caribbean.  The final country is South Africa.
Table Al provides basic descriptive  statistics on each country's structure of trade and
regional affiliation.
Each  individual country's  commodity price  index  is  constructed using
international commodity price  indices for  57  commodities. Table  A2  lists  the
commodities  used. Price data are mainly from  International Financial Statistics (IFS).
The single exception is the price of cocoa used for African countries, which is from
International  Cocoa  and Coffee  Organization  (ICCO), because the Ghanaian Cocoa
series in IFS is not credible, and has major gaps. A few important  commodities  have
not been included in the index due to lack of adequate data. These include notably
prices of natural gas and uranium ore. The indices for countries whose exports are
dominated by one or both of these commodities, such as Niger, which is a major
uranium producer,  should therefore  be interpreted  with caution.
50The complete quarterly data set covers the period from 1957Q1  to 1997Q4,
producing a total of 18,532  observations' 2. Unfortunately,  it was not possible to obtain
IFS data starting in 1957Q1  for al. commodities,  but since identical sample length is
an important  consideration  when rmeasuring  uncertainty,  it was decided to generate  the
missing observations.  This was do ne using a combination  of methods.  For series with
missing values at the start of the series for which other highly correlated series were
available, the missing values were generated using a partial adjustment regression
equation:
ln(X')  = A + A ln(X'-1 ) + A ln(  l) +e,  [Al]
where X,  is the series with the missing early values and Y, is a highly correlated
series with  a  full  set  of  observations. The regression was run  on  overlapping
observations,  and then used to 'backcast' the missing observations.  This method was
applied to 'fill'  the initial gap oF 12 observations  in the Palm Kernels and African
Cocoa series where the IFS series began only in 1960Q1.  The close correlates  were
IFS Palm Oil prices and Brazilian  Cocoa prices,  respectively.  For the following  series
with missing early values where no obvious correlates  were available, the early gaps
were filled using annual data as far as possible: Hardwood  (1958Q1-1969Q4),  Lead
(1957Q1-1963Q4),  Manganese  (1957Q1-1959Q4),  Rubber (1957Q1-1961Q4),  Silver
(1957Q1-1967Q4), Sorghum (1957Q1-1966Q4) and Sugar to  US ports (1957Q1-
1962Q4). Finally,  for  the  following few  commodities there  were  no  annual
observations to indicate the movements of the quarterly series, wherefore the real
price was held constant at the value of the first available observation:  Coal (1957Q1-
1966Q2),  Superphosphates  (195  7Q1-1962Q4),  and Tobacco (1957Q1-1967Q4).  The
nominal Gold price was held constant over the period of its missing observations
(1957-1962q4). A few commodities  had a occasional  missing observations in mid-
sample. These included Colombian  coffee (1994ql-q4), Manganese  (1963q2-1964q4;
1967q3-1968q4), Palm Kernels (1967q2-1967q4), Shrimps (1995q2), and  Silver
(1970q3).  These gaps are all veiy short and were filled by linear interpolation.
12113  countries  times  164 observations  per country.
51The biases  introduced  by filling early  gaps in the data using  annual data and
holding  real prices constant  are unlikely to be very  large for  the following  reasons.
First, the GARCH based uncertainty measure allows the uncertainty to vary with time,
so biases early on in the index have less of an effect in subsequent periods. Secondly,
the problem  of missing data mainly affects observations  in the very early part of the
indices,  which  is generally  outside  the  sample range  used  in  the  core  regressions.
Finally,  the number  of affected  observations  are only  332 out of a  total  sample  of
9348 observations'3, thus affecting only 3.46% of the observations.
The annual data used to locate discrete  shocks  also covers  the period  1957-
1997. Data  availability  was better  than  for the quarterly  series.  However, for  a few
commodities  there were missing observations in first part of the series. These included
Coal  (1957-1966),  Hardwood  (1957),  Superphosphates  (1957-62),  and  Tobacco
(1957-1967).  The missing values  for these commodities  were generated  by  holding
real prices  constant  at the value of the first available observation.  Gold  prices  were
unavailable  for  the  period  1957-1962,  and  its  nominal  price  was  therefore  held
constant for this period. Finally, Palm kernel prices for  1957-1959 were generated  as
annual  averages of the quarterly  observations  obtained  by the  regression with  Palm
Oil described above.
The data on export values used in constructing the weighting  item are exports
(fob) in current US$ in 1990. It was not possible to obtain quarterly weights so annual
1990 weights were also used for the base year in the quarterly indices; this also avoids
biases  arising  from  any  seasonal  effects  affecting  output.  The  weights  data  are
variously  from  UNCTAD's  Commodity  Yearbook 1994  and  the UN's  International
Trade  Statistics  Yearbook  (1993  and  1994).  In  some  cases,  the  weights  differed
considerably  across different sources  for no obvious reason.  In such cases,  the most
reasonable  figure  was  chosen  with reference  to  total  exports  data  from  alternative
sources such as individual countries own national accounts statistics. In a few cases, it
was not possible to obtain weights for the year  1990. In those cases a different  base
year was used for the weights.  Effort was made to select a new base year  as close to
1990 as possible. The cases with different base year weights are: 1994 (Aluminum,  St.
Vincent  and  Grenadines),  1984  (Beef,  Haiti),  1994  (Jute,  Rice  and  Hardwood,
Myanmar);  1989 (Sugar, Dominica). For South Africa, weights used were those of the
1  57 commodities times 164 observations per commodity.
52Southern African Customs Union (SACU) because data on  individual member
countries were unavailable.
Given the different availability of price and weight data across commodities,
there is a trade off between including  additional  commodities  in each country's index
and  losing observations in  the i:ime series dimension. For this reason, the final
specification  of the index for mo ,t countries does not include a complete set of the
exported commodities.  In deciding whether  to drop or retain a commodity,  the cost in
terms of lost observations from including an additional commodity was balanced
somewhat informally against the possible gain in terms of a more representative
index.  To  ensure  consistency and  to  minimize distortion to  the  final  index,
commodities were only dropped if they constituted  less than 10% of the commodity
exports of the country question, and if the number of available observations  for the
variable was lower than the nurnber of observations on all the other commodities
included in the index (i.e. the commodity constituted a data constraint). Only one
exception  was made to this rule. Woodpulp  was dropped from the index, because data
was only available from 1983QI onwards.  But Uruguay and South Africa produce
this commodity in moderate an.ounts (5 and 10% of sampled commodity exports,
respectively). So while the omission of this commodity is unlikely to affect most
indices it may have a minor  impact on the indices for these two countries.
The quarterly and annua. indices for each the countries were deflated by the
same deflator; namely the unit ralue index (1990=100)  of industrial country exports
from the International  FinancicI  Statistics. This index ('MUV') has been used as a
deflator of commodity  prices in other  recent work, e.g. Cashin, Liang and McDermott
(1999).
53Table Al:  Country Characteristics
id  country  Region  Producer 1990  Value of  1990 Value  19901ndexed  1990  Total
type  Indexed  of Total  Commodities  Exports as a
Commodities  Exports  as a Share of  Share of GDP
(US$m)  (US$m)  Total Exports
1 Algeria  2  4  2,309  14,425  0.16  0.23
2 Angola  1  4  2,800  1,493  1.87  0.39
3 Argentina  3  1  3,733  14,643  0.25  0.10
4 Bahamas, The  7  4  1,525  1,664  0.92  0.61
5 Bahrain  2  4  2,939  4,888  0.60  1.22
6 Bangladesh  4  2  617  1,882  0.33  0.08
7 Barbados  7  1  32  840  0.04  0.49
8 Belize  7  1  53  257  0.20  0.64
9 Benin  1  2  99  402  0.25  0.22
10 Bhutan  4  1  1  92  0.01  0.32
11 Bolivia  3  3  450  978  0.46  0.22
12 Botswana  1  1  116  1,895  0.06  0.56
13 Brazil  3  1  8,844  34,339  0.26  0.07
14 Burkina Faso  1  2  95  352  0.27  0.13
15 Burundi  1  1  68  89  0.76  0.08
16 Cameroon  1  5  1,011  2,275  0.44  0.20
17 Cape Verde  1  1  2  56  0.03  0.18
18 CAR  1  1  54  220  0.25  0.15
19 Chad  1  2  91  234  0.39  0.19
20 Chile  3  3  4,256  10,470  0.41  0.34
21 Colombia  3  1  3,806  8,283  0.46  0.21
22 Congo  1  4  1,103  1,433  0.77  0.51
23 Costa Rica  3  1  682  1,975  0.35  0.35
24 Coted'lvoire  1  1  1,667  3,421  0.49  0.32
25 Djibouti  1  1  2  249  0.01  0.55
26 Dominica  7  1  32  70  0.45  0.46
27 Dominican  Republic  7  3  571  2,301  0.25  0.34
28 Ecuador  3  4  2,345  3,499  0.67  0.33
29 Egypt  2  4  956  8,647  0.11  0.20
30 El Salvador  3  1  213  892  0.24  0.19
31 Ethiopia  1  1  212  535  0.40  0.08
32 Fiji  6  1  216  879  0.25  0.64
33 Gabon  1  4  2,462  2,740  0.90  0.46
34 Gambia  1  1  13  201  0.07  0.69
35 Ghana  1  5  1,041  993  1.05  0.17
36 Grenada  7  1  8  110  0.07  0.49
37 Guatemala  3  1  651  1,509  0.43  0.20
38 Guinea  1  1  12  870  0.01  0.31
39 Guinea-Bissau  1  2  2  26  0.09  0.11
40 Guyana  3  1  224  249  0.90  0.63
41 Haiti  7  1  21  477  0.04  0.16
42 Honduras  3  1  427  1,108  0.39  0.36
43 India  4  1  3,158  23,026  0.14  0.08
44 Indonesia  5  4  11,515  29,912  0.38  0.26
45 Iran  2  4  17,036  26,476  0.64  0.22
46 Iraq  2  4  8,881  NA  NA  0.27
47 Jamaica  7  3  851  2,207  0.39  0.52
48 Jordan  2  3  215  2,489  0.09  0.62
49 Kenya  1  1  377  2,234  0.17  0.26
5450 Korea,  Republic of  5  1  781  75,544  0.01  0.30
51 Kuwait  2  4  2,607  8,281  0.31  0.45
52 Lao P.D.R  5  1  12  98  0.12  0.11
53 Lesotho  1  2  7  89  0.08  0.14
54 Liberia  1  2  288  464  0.62  0.43
55 Madagascar  1  1  111  489  0.23  0.16
56 Malawi  1  2  382  447  0.85  0.24
57 Malaysia  5  4  8,548  32,664  0.26  0.76
58 Mali  1  2  218  415  0.52  0.17
59 Mauritania  1  3  232  473  0.49  0.46
60 Mauritius  1  1  358  1,724  0.21  0.65
61 Mexico  3  4  10,460  48,866  0.21  0.19
62 Mongolia  5  3  321  436  0.74  0.21
63 Morocco  2  3  1,179  6,849  0.17  0.27
64 Mozambique  1  1  61  230  0.26  0.16
65 Myanmar  4  2  218  NA  NA  0,03
66 Namibia  1  3  202  1,217  0.17  0.49
67 Nepal  4  2  6  382  0.02  0.11
68 Nicaragua  3  1  279  253  1.10  0.25
69 Niger  1  2  5  420  0.01  0.17
70 Nigeria  1  4  12,754  12,366  1.03  0.43
71 Oman  2  4  4,768  5,555  0.86  0.53
72 Pakistan  4  2  873  5,918  0.15  0.15
73 Panama  3  1  200  4,611  0.04  0.87
74 Papua New Guinea  5  3  1,164  1,309  0.89  0.41
75 Paraguay  3  1  808  1,750  0.46  0.33
76 Peru  3  3  1,549  3,937  0.39  0.12
77 Philippines  5  1  1,326  12,198  0.11  0.28
78 Qatar  2  4  2,872  NA  NA  0.52
79 Reunion  1  1  142  NA  NA  0.05
80 Rwanda  1  1  121  145  0.83  0.06
81 Saudi Arabia  2  4  34,168  48,366  0.71  0.46
82 Senegal  1  1  252  1,512  0.17  0.27
83 Seychelles  1  2  0  256  0.00  0.68
84 Sierra Leone  1  3  41  215  0.19  0.24
85 Singapore  5  5  2,278  73,999  0.03  1.98
86 Solomon  Islands  6  2  40  99  0.40  0.47
87 Somalia  1  1  43  90  0.48  0.10
88 South  Africa  8  3  3,155  27,327  0.12  0.26
89 Sri Lanka  4  1  601  2,424  0.25  0.30
90 St. Kitts and Nevis  7  1  9  75  0.12  0.59
91 St. Lucia  7  1  78  288  0.27  0.72
92 St. Vincent  7  1  48  128  0.38  0.66
93 Sudan  1  2  253  653  0.39  0.07
94 Suriname  3  3  427  420  1.02  0.43
95 Swaziland  1  1  187  690  0.27  0.83
96 Syrian  Arab Republic  2  4  1,690  3,413  0.50  0.28
97 Tanzania  1  1  200  555  0.36  0.13
98 Thailand  5  1  2,828  29,130  0.10  0.34
99 Togo  1  3  225  545  0.41  0.33
100 Tonga  6  1  0  36  0.01  0.32
101 Trinidad &Tobago  7  4  858  2,214  0.39  0.44
102 Tunisia  2  4  738  5,353  0.14  0.44
103 Turkey  2  2  891  20,016  0.04  0.13
55104 Uganda  1  1  167  312  0.53  0.07
105 United  Arab Emirates  2  4  13,403  22,331  0.60  0.66
106 Uruguay  3  1  656  2,185  0.30  0.26
107 Vanuatu  6  1  11  71  0.15  0.46
108 Venezuela  3  4  10,371  19,168  0.54  0.39
109 Western Samoa  6  1  5  45  0.10  0.31
110 Yemen,  Republic of  2  1  40  689  0.06  0.15
111 Zaire  1  3  949  2,758  0.34  0.30
112 Zambia  1  3  1,167  1,180  0.99  0.36
113 Zimbabwe  1  2  830  2,174  0.38  0.32
TOTAL  217,253  714,155
(Note: Regions: I-Sub-Saharan  Africa; 2-Middle East and North Africa; 3-Latin America; 4-South  Asia; 5-East Asia; 6-Pacific;
7-Caribbean; 8-South  Africa.  Type:  I-Agricultural food  stuffs;  2-Agricultural  non-foods;  3-Non-Agricultural non-oil
commodities; 4-Oil; 5-Mixed; 'NA': not available).
56Table  A2: Commodities  Used in Country  Indices
ID  IFS Name  IFS  Code  1990  Value of World  1990  Share in
Exports (US$m)  World Commodity
Exports
1 ALUMINUM  15676DRDZF  ...  4,514  0.021
2 BANANAS  24876U.DZF  ...  1,993  0.009
3 BEEF  19376KBDZF  ...  1,360  0.006
4 COAL  19374VRDZF  ...  1,489  0.007
5 COCOA (Brazil)  22374R.DZF  ...  992  0.005
6 COCOA (ICCO)  OBCS  1,617  0.007
7 COCONUT  OIL (Philippines)  56676AI.ZF  ...  361  0.002
8 COCONUT  OIL  New  York  56676AIDZF  ...  163  0.001
9 COFFEE BRAZIL  22376EBDZF  ...  1,283  0.006
10 COFFEE COLOMBIA  23376E.DZF  ...  1,473  0.007
11 COFFEE OTHER  MILDS  38676EBDZF  ...  2,539  0.012
12 COFFEE UGANDA  79976ECDZF...  1,357  0.006
13 COPPER UK  11276C.DZF  ...  8,889  0.041
14 COPRA PHILIPP  56676AGDZF  ...  68  0.000
15 COTTON  11176F.DZFM40  3,626  0.017
16 FISHMEAL  29376Z.DZF  ...  768  0.004
17 GOLD  11276KRDZF  ...  617  0.003
18 GROUNDNUT  OIL  69476BIDZF  ...  222  0.001
19 GROUNDNUTS  69476BHDZF  ...  172  0.001
20 HARDWOOD  54876RMDZF  ...  1,850  0.009
21 HIDES  11176P.DZF  ...  603  0.003
22 IRON ORE  22376GADZF  ...  4,164  0.019
23 JUTE  51376X.DZF  ...  743  0.003
24 LAMB  19676PFDZF  ...  32  0.000
25 LEAD  11176V.DZF  ...  272  0.001
26 LINSEED OIL  00176NIDZF  ...  96  0.000
27 MAIZE  11176J.DZFM17  744  0.003
28 MANGANESE  53476W.DZF  ...  717  0.003
29 NEWSPRINT  17272UL.ZF  ...  143  0.001
30 NICKEL  15676PTDZF  ...  939  0.004
31 OIL  00176AADZF  ...  143,187  0.659
32 PALM KERNELS  54876DFDZF  ...  0  0.000
33 PALM  OIL  54876DGDZF  ...  1,994  0.009
34 PHOSPHATE  ROCK  68676AWDZF  ...  902  0.004
35 RICE  57874N  .ZF...  866  0.004
36 RICE  THAILAND (BANGKOK)  57876N.DZFM81  923  0.004
37 RUBBER  11176L.DZF...  2,007  0.009
38 RUBBER  MALAYSIA  54876L.DZF...  1,122  0.005
39 SHRIMP  11176BLDZF...  4,643  0.021
40 SILVER  11176Y.DZF...  715  0.003
41 SISAL  63976MLDZF...  54  0.000
42 SORGHUM  11176TRDZF...  24  0.000
43 SOYBEAN  MEAL  11176JJDZF...  1,626  0.007
44 SOYBEAN  OIL  11176JIDZF...  1,073  0.005
45 SOYBEANS  11176JFDZF...  1,932  0.009
46 SUGAR  223741.DZF...  1,861  0.009
47 SUGAR  EEC IMPORT  112761.DZF...  1,406  0.006
48 SUPERPHOSPHATE  11176ASDZF...  498  0.002
49 TEA (Sri Lanka)  52474S  .ZF...  493  0.002
5750 TEA AVERAGE  AUCTION  11276S.DZF  ...  1,262  0.006
51 TIN (Bolivia)  21874Q.DZF  ...  84  0.000
52 TIN ALL ORIGINS  11276Q.DZF  ...  2,566  0.012
53 TOBACCO  11176M.DZF  ...  1,050  0.005
54 UREA  17076URDZF  ...  445  0.002
55 WHEAT  11176D.DZF  ...  1,259  0.006
56 WOOL  11276HDDZF  ...  720  0.003
57 ZINC  11276T.DZF...  733  0.003
TOTAL  217,253  1.000
(Note: 'QBCS' stands  for  Quaterly  Bulletin of Cocoa  Statistics)
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